Draft Status and Use
Purpose of this packet
This packet is the working governing framework for the Federal Public Authority, Privatization Transparency, and Accountability Initiative (FPAPTAA). It is written to be specific enough for public review, agency planning, congressional drafting, and independent legal review. It is not final.
Government may purchase private expertise. It must remain legally accountable for public authority.
The packet separates five things that public debate often blends together: what the law already says, what this initiative proposes to change, what has been documented, what has only been proposed, and what has only been alleged. Every factual statement is tied to a source listed in Appendix A. Every legal question that needs a licensed attorney, legislative counsel, or the Congressional Budget Office is listed in Appendix B.
The people who run these institutions, including air traffic controllers, technicians, engineers, inspectors, contract employees, and the communities that depend on them, should have a real role in finishing this framework. Their review is a required step before any provision is finalized, not a courtesy.
This is a policy and legislative discussion draft. Before introduction or signature, the statutory language should be reviewed by the House or Senate Office of Legislative Counsel, the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Legal Counsel, agency general counsels, inspectors general, procurement-law specialists, constitutional counsel, federal labor organizations, and the public.
Nothing in this packet asserts that any official, agency, or company has acted unlawfully. Where the packet names a contract or a company, it does so because the arrangement is a matter of public record and is useful for testing the review method. Naming an arrangement is not an accusation.
Part I
Part I - Executive Policy Overview
Across the country, Americans are asking a simple question with a complicated answer: when the federal government restructures an agency or hands a function to a contractor, who ends up owning the equipment, controlling the software, employing the workforce, and making the decisions?
Most of the time the honest answer is reassuring. The federal government has bought goods and services from private companies since the founding, and most contracts are ordinary procurement. But some arrangements go further. They place essential infrastructure, proprietary systems, operational data, or day-to-day control of a public function in private hands for long periods, sometimes without a clear public record of who ultimately owns the contractor or whether the government could operate the function without it.
No single office in the federal government is currently responsible for answering, across every agency, three questions: what has been privatized, who controls it, and whether the public could take it back. This initiative creates that capability.
What the initiative does
ElementWhat it does
01
Privatization Classification System
A ten-category legal framework that separates ordinary procurement from contractor-operated support, contractor-owned infrastructure, delegated authority, asset transfers, and full privatization, so that ordinary contracting is never mislabeled and real transfers of authority are never hidden.
02
Federal Public Authority Review
A six-phase, government-wide review of agency functions, legal authority, ownership and control, operational dependence, public accountability, and remediation, run with inspector general independence.
03
FAA Pilot Investigation
The first full application of the method to air traffic control, where modernization spending, a prime integrator, and a contractor-run telecommunications backbone make the questions concrete and testable.
04
Beneficial-Ownership and Concentration Review
A lawful process for learning who ultimately controls major federal contractors, distinguishing passive investment from operational control, and identifying where common ownership concentrates across essential services.
05
Executive Order
Day-one direction to executive agencies, with 30-, 90-, 180-, and 365-day deadlines, limited to what existing law allows the President to require.
06
Federal Public Authority and Privatization Accountability Act of 2029
Statutory definitions, congressional notification before material transfers, required legal review, government data and step-in rights, ownership disclosure, worker protections, and enforcement that outlast any single administration.
07
Transparency Portal
A searchable public record of covered arrangements, ownership, legal authority, dependency ratings, audit findings, and corrective action, with security and privacy protections built in.
08
Worker Protections
Safeguards for federal employees and contractor employees affected by any transfer or insourcing, coordinated with the American Worker Protection and Human-AI Collaboration Policy.
What the initiative does not do
- It does not treat all private contracting as privatization.
- It does not treat private equity, institutional investment, or shared ownership as evidence of misconduct.
- It does not assume that any Project 2025 proposal has been carried out. It requires evidence of what actually happened.
- It does not claim presidential power over Congress, the courts, independent agencies, or private companies beyond what the law already provides.
- It does not prohibit modernization. It requires that modernization leave the public in control of what the public paid for.
Why now
On November 17, 2026, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the FAA Administrator asked the House and Senate Appropriations Committees for $50.1 billion to modernize the air traffic control system and related airport infrastructure. Four days earlier, on November 13, a failure in legacy telecommunications equipment led the FAA to stop departures nationwide. Congress had already provided $12.5 billion for the same effort in July 2025. In September 2026, the Government Accountability Office reported that the program lacked a reliable lifecycle cost estimate and an integrated master schedule.
The request letter breaks down how the money would be spent. It does not say who will own the new systems, who will operate them, or how the government will avoid becoming dependent on a single vendor. Those are the questions this initiative is built to answer, for aviation first and then for every agency.
One-Page Public Policy Brief
The problem
Taxpayers fund the infrastructure that runs essential public services. But the public record often cannot show who owns that infrastructure, who controls the software and data, who employs the people operating it, or whether the government could keep the service running if a contractor failed, raised prices, or walked away.
The principle
Contracting may change who performs a service. It must not unlawfully change who exercises sovereign authority or who remains accountable to the American people.
The plan
- Find out what has been privatized. Every executive agency inventories its outsourced functions, contractor-owned infrastructure, and long-term service dependencies.
- Check the legal authority. Each arrangement is matched to the statute, appropriation, and contract that authorizes it.
- Identify who is really in control. Major contractors are traced to their ultimate beneficial owners through lawful records.
- Measure dependence. Agencies show whether they could operate essential functions without their current contractors.
- Publish the findings. A public report and a searchable portal, with classified and security-sensitive details protected.
- Fix what is broken. Contract modifications, data and step-in rights, competition safeguards, insourcing where justified, and referral to inspectors general where evidence warrants.
- Make it permanent. The Federal Public Authority and Privatization Accountability Act of 2029 writes the safeguards into law.
Part II
Part II - The Policy Vision and the Federal Privatization Classification System
The vision
A republic governs through public officials who answer to the people through elections, Congress, the courts, and the law. Private companies can and should help the government build, maintain, and modernize. But the authority to make binding public decisions, the duty to keep essential services running, and the obligation to answer for failure belong to the government.
This initiative is built on four commitments.
- Public authority stays public. Decisions that bind the public, commit public money, or exercise sovereign power are made by accountable officials.
- Public assets stay recoverable. Whatever taxpayers finance, the government must be able to inspect, operate, replace, or reclaim.
- Control is visible. The public can learn who owns and controls the companies running essential functions.
- Workers are protected. The people who operate these institutions are consulted before change and protected through it.
Why a classification system comes first
The word privatization is used to describe very different things: buying office supplies, hiring a company to run a call center, leasing a satellite, letting a contractor staff a control tower, selling a federal asset, or creating a new corporation to take over a government function. Treating these as the same thing produces bad policy in both directions. It can make ordinary procurement look sinister, and it can let a real transfer of authority hide inside a routine contract.
The classification system below gives every agency, auditor, and member of the public the same vocabulary. Each covered arrangement receives one primary classification and, where applicable, secondary flags.
The ten classifications
| Class | Name | Plain description | Example of the kind of arrangement covered |
|---|---|---|---|
| C-1 | Ordinary procurement of goods and services | The government buys commercial items or routine services and retains all decisions. | Office equipment, commercial software licenses, facilities maintenance. |
| C-2 | Contractor-operated support functions | Contractor employees perform support work under government direction and decision. | Help desks, logistics support, technical writing, data entry. |
| C-3 | Government-owned, contractor-operated infrastructure (GOCO) | The government owns the asset; a contractor runs it. | A federally owned facility operated by a management-and-operating contractor. |
| C-4 | Contractor-owned, government-operated infrastructure (COGO) | A contractor owns the asset; government employees run it. | Leased equipment or licensed proprietary systems operated by federal staff. |
| C-5 | Contractor-owned and contractor-operated essential infrastructure (COCO) | A contractor both owns and runs infrastructure an essential function depends on. | A contractor-owned telecommunications network delivered as a service. |
| C-6 | Public-private partnership | A long-term agreement sharing financing, risk, and return between government and a private party. | Availability-payment or revenue-sharing infrastructure agreements. |
| C-7 | Federally chartered or government-sponsored entity | An entity created or chartered by statute that operates outside ordinary agency structure. | Government corporations and government-sponsored enterprises. |
| C-8 | Delegation of discretionary or regulatory authority | A private party makes, or effectively makes, decisions that bind the public or the government. | Private standard-setting or enforcement with government adoption. |
| C-9 | Transfer of public assets | Federal property, rights, data, or infrastructure moves out of federal ownership. | Sale, long-term lease, or conveyance of federal facilities or spectrum. |
| C-10 | Privatization of an entire governmental function | Responsibility for a public function moves from the government to a non-federal entity. | Creating a separate corporation to take over a federal service. |
What must be identified for every classification
For each covered arrangement, the responsible agency must document the following eleven attributes. Together they form the arrangement's control profile.
| Attribute | Question the agency must answer |
|---|---|
| Legal authority | Which statute, appropriation, regulation, delegation, and contract authorize this arrangement? |
| Physical assets | Who holds title to the equipment, facilities, and hardware? |
| Software | Who owns the code, who holds the license, and can the government inspect, modify, or move it? |
| Operational data | Who controls the data, in what format, and can the government obtain a complete copy at any time? |
| Personnel | Who employs and supervises the people performing the function, and who directs their work? |
| Termination and step-in rights | Can the government terminate, and can it take over operations in an emergency? |
| Replaceability | Could the government replace this contractor within a defined period without interrupting the service? |
| Financial obligations | What does the government owe over the full life of the arrangement, including exit costs? |
| Oversight and audit | Do inspectors general, GAO, and the contracting office have full access to records and systems? |
| Delegation risk | Does any private party make or effectively make decisions that bind the public? |
| Security and continuity | What are the cybersecurity, supply-chain, foreign-control, and emergency-continuity risks? |
The classification decision matrix
The matrix sorts every arrangement into one of three review tracks. The track determines the level of scrutiny, not a conclusion about legality.
| Track | When it applies | What happens |
|---|---|---|
| Track 1: Lawful contracting, standard oversight | C-1 or C-2; government retains all decisions; assets, data, and software are government-owned or fully portable; no single-vendor dependency for an essential function. | Recorded in the inventory. Normal contract administration. No additional review. |
| Track 2: Potentially problematic, enhanced review | C-3 through C-6 for an essential function; or any arrangement where the government lacks complete data rights, lacks step-in rights, or could not replace the contractor within the defined replacement period; or where ownership is not known to the beneficial-owner level. | Dependency risk scoring (Part VII). Corrective plan within 180 days. Published in the portal. |
| Track 3: Formal legal review required | C-7 through C-10; or any arrangement in any class where a private party makes or effectively makes binding public decisions, performs a function listed as inherently governmental, uses appropriated funds outside their stated purpose, or was implemented without required notice or authority. | Written legal opinion from the agency general counsel within 90 days, inspector general notification, and referral to the Office of Legal Counsel where questions remain. |
Rules for applying the matrix
- Classification follows substance, not labels. An arrangement is classified by what each party actually owns, controls, decides, and can refuse, not by what the contract calls it.
- The highest applicable track governs. If any attribute places an arrangement in Track 3, it is reviewed in Track 3.
- Track placement is not a finding of wrongdoing. Track 3 means a lawyer must look, not that the law has been broken.
- Long-standing authorized arrangements are recorded as such. A program Congress created and funds, such as the FAA Contract Tower Program, is classified and reviewed on its merits, with its statutory basis recorded.
Inherently governmental, closely associated, and critical functions
Federal law already draws lines that this initiative uses rather than replaces. The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 defines an inherently governmental function as one so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by federal government employees. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy's Policy Letter 11-01 adds two further categories: functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions, which contractors may perform only with heightened management attention, and critical functions, where agencies must keep enough internal capability to maintain control of their mission. FAR Subpart 7.5 states that contracts shall not be used for the performance of inherently governmental functions and lists examples.
The classification system is designed to sit on top of these existing rules. Its additional contribution is to examine ownership, data, software, replaceability, and beneficial control, which existing inventories do not consistently capture.
Part III
Part III - Constitutional and Statutory Legal Memorandum
To
The President-elect's transition counsel; incoming agency general counsels; congressional sponsors
From
Cordova 2028 Policy Development (discussion draft for licensed-attorney review)
Re
Legal foundation and limits of the Federal Public Authority, Privatization Transparency, and Accountability Initiative
Status
Discussion draft. Not legal advice. Every conclusion below is subject to the review listed in Appendix B.
Question presented
What does existing constitutional and statutory law permit, require, and prohibit when the federal government transfers, contracts out, or reorganizes public functions, and which parts of this initiative can be carried out by executive action alone versus legislation?
Short answer
Existing law permits extensive federal contracting and many forms of public-private arrangement. It does not require a public referendum or, in many cases, a specific congressional vote before an agency contracts for services within its existing authority. But that authority is bounded. The executive branch may not spend money for purposes Congress has not approved, may not reorganize statutory agencies without legislation, may not contract out inherently governmental functions, and may not give private parties unsupervised power to make binding governmental decisions. An arrangement that crosses those lines can be challenged, but it is not automatically void; a court or agency must find it unlawful through a proper proceeding brought by a party with standing.
Most of this initiative's review, inventory, reporting, and contract-term measures can be implemented through an executive order directing executive agencies. Binding obligations on independent agencies, new private rights of action, new statutory definitions, mandatory beneficial-ownership disclosure by contractors beyond existing regulation, and new funding all require legislation.
I. Constitutional framework
Article I: Congress controls law and money
Article I vests all legislative powers in Congress. The Appropriations Clause provides that no money may be drawn from the Treasury except in consequence of appropriations made by law. The Spending Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause give Congress authority to fund, structure, and condition federal programs. Together these mean that Congress, not the executive, decides what agencies exist, what they are authorized to do, and what they may spend money on.
Article II: the executive carries out the law
Article II vests the executive power in the President and requires that the laws be faithfully executed. The President supervises executive agencies and may direct how they exercise discretion Congress has given them. The President may not create, abolish, or restructure statutory agencies by order. General presidential reorganization authority under 5 U.S.C. 901 and following has not been renewed since 1984, so structural changes such as separating the Air Traffic Organization from the FAA would require legislation. The Project 2025 aviation chapter itself describes its proposed organizational changes as requiring legislation.
The Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause requires that officers of the United States be appointed through constitutionally prescribed methods. Under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), a person exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an officer. Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237 (2018), and United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1 (2021), apply that test. A private contractor's employees are not appointed officers, which is one reason private parties may not exercise significant governmental authority on their own.
Separation of powers and the chain of accountability
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), and Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197 (2020), concern the President's power to remove officials, not privatization. Their relevance here is the principle they rely on: the Constitution requires a clear chain of accountability from those who exercise executive power to the President and through the President to the people. Seila Law held the CFPB director's removal protection unconstitutional but severable; it did not invalidate the agency. Those cases do not by themselves limit contracting, and this memorandum does not claim that they do.
II. The private nondelegation doctrine
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
The Court struck down a provision of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act that allowed a majority of coal producers and miners to fix maximum hours and minimum wages binding on the rest of the industry. The Court described delegating that power to private parties, whose interests may be adverse to those they regulate, as legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form. Carter Coal is the foundation of the principle that government may not hand binding regulatory power to private actors.
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940)
Four years later the Court upheld a revised scheme in which private boards proposed prices but a public commission retained authority and surveillance over their activities and made the final decisions. The private parties functioned subordinately to the government. Sunshine Anthracite defines what is generally permitted: private parties may advise, propose, and assist, so long as the government retains real decision-making power.
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U.S. 43 (2015)
The D.C. Circuit had held that Amtrak was a private entity that could not jointly issue binding standards. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for purposes of separation-of-powers analysis Amtrak is a governmental entity, because of the degree of political-branch control over it, and remanded other questions. The decision shows that courts look past labels to who actually controls an entity. It does not decide what happens when a genuinely private party exercises regulatory power.
FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606 U.S. 656 (2025)
Decided June 27, 2025, by a 6-3 vote, this is the Court's most recent treatment of the doctrine. The Court rejected the argument that the FCC unconstitutionally delegated power to the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private entity that produces the financial projections used to set universal-service contribution rates. The Court held that the FCC retained final decision-making authority, so USAC's role was subordinate and advisory. The Court also held that public and private nondelegation analyses do not combine to create a violation where neither is independently violated. One concurring Justice expressed skepticism that a private nondelegation doctrine exists as an independent doctrine at all.
What the doctrine does and does not support
The doctrine is real but narrow. Under current precedent it is most likely to be violated when a private party makes final, binding decisions affecting others without meaningful government review. It is unlikely to be violated when a contractor builds, operates, or maintains systems under government direction, makes recommendations the government reviews, or performs ministerial work. According to the Congressional Research Service's September 2026 summary, lower courts have divided on remand over the private enforcement powers of the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority, and the United States has sought Supreme Court review, so the doctrine's boundaries may shift.
This initiative therefore does not rely on the private nondelegation doctrine as its primary tool. It treats the doctrine as a constitutional floor and builds its main protections through statute, contract terms, transparency, and oversight.
III. Statutory framework
| Authority | What it does | Relevance to this initiative |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (FAIR Act), Pub. L. 105-270, 31 U.S.C. 501 note | Requires executive agencies to publish annual inventories of commercial activities performed by federal employees and defines inherently governmental function. | The existing inventory framework. It counts commercial activities performed in-house; it does not systematically capture contractor ownership, data rights, or dependency. The initiative extends it. |
| OFPP Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227 (Sept. 12, 2011) | Defines inherently governmental, closely associated, and critical functions; requires agencies to keep sufficient internal capability for critical functions. | The policy basis for requiring agencies to prove they can operate essential functions without a given contractor. |
| Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 7.5 | States that contracts shall not be used for the performance of inherently governmental functions and lists examples. Retained in the 2025 Revolutionary FAR Overhaul model deviation. | Applies to most executive agencies. The FAA is a notable exception (see below). |
| 49 U.S.C. 40110(d) | Directs the FAA to use its own Acquisition Management System; the FAR and several procurement statutes do not apply to FAA acquisitions. | The FAA pilot must use FAA's AMS rules, not FAR, as the baseline. Legislative counsel should confirm which FAR-based protections reach the FAA. |
| Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 41 U.S.C. 3301 and following; 10 U.S.C. 3201 and following | Requires full and open competition with defined exceptions. | Sole-source and single-award justifications are a key review input. |
| GAO bid protests, 31 U.S.C. 3551-3556; Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b) | Allow interested parties to challenge procurement decisions. | A remedy available only to eligible interested parties, generally actual or prospective bidders. |
| Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-282; DATA Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-101 | Require public reporting of federal awards on USAspending.gov. | The primary public data source for the portal. |
| Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018, Title II of Pub. L. 115-390, 41 U.S.C. 1321-1328 and 41 U.S.C. 4713 | Creates the Federal Acquisition Security Council and authority to exclude or remove sources posing supply-chain risk. | Basis for incorporating foreign-control and supply-chain risk into dependency scoring. |
| Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 | Public right of access to agency records, subject to nine exemptions, including Exemption 4 for confidential commercial information as interpreted in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427 (2019). | Sets what the portal can publish and what must be withheld. 41 U.S.C. 4702 separately restricts release of contractor proposals. |
| Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. chapters 29, 31, and 33 | Requires agencies to create and preserve records documenting their decisions and functions. | Records created by contractors on the government's behalf can be federal records; the initiative requires contract terms that make this explicit. |
| Inspector General Act of 1978, as codified at 5 U.S.C. 401-424 | Establishes independent inspectors general with access to agency records. | The initiative routes all misconduct questions to inspectors general rather than political appointees. |
| Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551-559 and 701-706 | Allows review of final agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law, subject to limits for actions committed to agency discretion. | A potential judicial pathway for challenges to agency restructuring decisions, subject to standing and reviewability. |
| Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341; Purpose Statute, 31 U.S.C. 1301(a) | Prohibit obligations in excess of appropriations and require funds to be used for their appropriated purposes. | A transfer of function funded by money appropriated for something else would raise appropriations-law questions. |
| Corporate Transparency Act, 31 U.S.C. 5336 | Created federal beneficial-ownership reporting. Under a FinCEN final rule effective August 14, 2026, domestic companies and U.S. persons are exempt; reporting is limited mainly to certain foreign entities. | There is currently no general federal beneficial-ownership database covering domestic contractors. The initiative's ownership review must rely on procurement disclosures and new contract terms, and legislation is needed for anything broader. |
| FAR 52.204-17 (Ownership or Control of Offeror) and SAM.gov registration | Require offerors to identify immediate and highest-level owners. | The existing, limited ownership disclosure. Does not reach individual beneficial owners or non-controlling investors. |
| National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, 32 C.F.R. part 117; 50 U.S.C. 4565 (CFIUS) | Govern foreign ownership, control, or influence for cleared contractors and review of certain foreign investments. | Existing foreign-control tools the review must coordinate with rather than duplicate. |
| Contractor whistleblower protection, 41 U.S.C. 4712; federal employee protection, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8) | Protect disclosures of waste, fraud, abuse, and violations of law. | The basis for whistleblower safeguards in the executive order and legislation. |
| Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7101-7135; for FAA, 49 U.S.C. 40122 | Govern collective bargaining for federal employees; FAA has its own personnel management system. | Worker protection provisions must account for FAA's separate personnel statute. |
IV. Can a president privatize government without a vote?
There are three different kinds of approval, and they should not be confused.
- A public referendum. The Constitution does not provide for national referendums and does not require one before the government contracts for services or restructures an agency.
- A congressional vote. Congress must act to create, abolish, or restructure statutory agencies, to appropriate money, to authorize transfers between appropriation accounts, and to grant authority an agency does not already have. Many contracts, however, are issued under authority Congress granted years earlier, so a new vote is not always required.
- Executive authority. Agencies may contract, reorganize internal offices, and manage operations within their existing statutory authority and appropriations. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), remains the framework: executive power is at its lowest when it acts against the expressed or implied will of Congress.
If an agency transfers a governmental function beyond its legal authority, the action may be challenged and set aside. It does not become void on its own simply because voters did not approve it, and it does not become lawful merely because an agency signed a contract. Since Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), courts no longer defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, which makes the statutory text Congress writes more important. This is one reason the initiative proposes precise statutory definitions.
V. What if a contractor owns the equipment and employs the personnel?
An arrangement in which a contractor owns essential infrastructure, controls proprietary software, and employs the operating workforce is privatization in part. Whether it is lawful depends on four questions.
- Is any of the work inherently governmental? If contractor employees make final, binding public decisions, the arrangement likely violates FAR Subpart 7.5 or the agency's equivalent, and may raise constitutional questions.
- Does the government retain real decision-making authority? Under Sunshine Anthracite and Consumers' Research, retained government authority is usually decisive.
- Is it authorized and funded? The arrangement must rest on statutory authority and appropriations for that purpose.
- Can the government still meet its legal obligations? If dependency is so complete that the agency cannot perform a function the law requires it to perform, there may be a statutory violation even where no constitutional line is crossed. OFPP Policy Letter 11-01's critical-functions requirement addresses this risk as policy.
VI. Standing, jurisdiction, and remedies
A person who objects to a privatization arrangement must still satisfy Article III. Under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), a plaintiff must show a concrete and particularized injury, fairly traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed by a court. Generalized taxpayer or citizen objections usually do not qualify. Sovereign immunity limits money damages against the United States except where Congress has waived it. The APA waives immunity for non-monetary relief against final agency action. Bid protests are limited to interested parties. These limits are why the initiative relies primarily on executive and legislative action rather than litigation, and why the proposed legislation includes a carefully limited review provision that legislative counsel must evaluate.
VII. Counterarguments and alternatives
Argument: contracting improves efficiency and the government should not second-guess it
Many contracting arrangements save money and bring expertise the government lacks. Several countries operate air navigation services through corporatized or commercial entities, and supporters argue those models modernize faster. The response is that this initiative does not oppose contracting or alternative structures. It requires that any structure keep public authority accountable and public assets recoverable. Those conditions are compatible with efficient contracting and are, in fact, protections against vendor lock-in that also benefit taxpayers.
Argument: the review will burden agencies and slow modernization
A government-wide inventory takes staff and time. The response is that the review is tiered: Track 1 arrangements, the large majority, need only be recorded. The burden falls on arrangements involving essential functions and real dependency. The fiscal assessment in Part XI provides low, baseline, and high cost scenarios so that Congress can weigh the cost against the risk.
Argument: ownership disclosure invades legitimate business confidentiality
Companies have lawful interests in protecting proprietary information. The response is that the initiative publishes ownership only to the controlling level, protects trade secrets under FOIA Exemption 4 and 41 U.S.C. 4702, and requires individual beneficial-ownership data only from contractors performing essential functions, held confidentially by the government.
Argument: existing law already covers this
FAR Subpart 7.5, the FAIR Act, and Policy Letter 11-01 address some of the same concerns. The response is that those authorities focus on who performs the work. They do not systematically record who owns the infrastructure, software, and data, or whether the government could replace the contractor. The FAA is also outside the FAR. The initiative fills those gaps.
Alternatives considered
| Alternative | Advantage | Limitation |
|---|---|---|
| Rely on existing FAIR Act inventories | No new cost | Does not capture ownership, data rights, or dependency |
| GAO or inspector general reviews on request | Independent and credible | Case by case; no government-wide picture |
| Executive order only | Fast, no legislation needed | Reversible by the next administration; cannot bind independent agencies |
| Legislation only | Durable | Slow; nothing happens until enactment |
| Executive order now, legislation to make it permanent (recommended) | Immediate action and durability | Requires sustained congressional engagement |
Part IV
Part IV - Draft Executive Order
DISCUSSION DRAFT
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Federal Public Authority, Privatization Transparency, and Essential Government Accountability
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 3 U.S.C. 301, 31 U.S.C. 1111, 40 U.S.C. 121, 41 U.S.C. 1121, and the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SEC. 1.Purpose and Policy.
(a) The Federal Government may obtain goods, services, technology, and expertise from private parties. It may not, through contract or reorganization, unlawfully transfer sovereign authority, obscure who controls essential public functions, or become so dependent on a private party that it cannot meet its legal obligations to the American people.
(b) It is the policy of the United States that every executive department and agency shall know, document, and be able to demonstrate who owns, controls, and operates the infrastructure, software, data, and workforce on which its essential functions depend, and shall retain the authority and capability to direct, replace, and answer for those functions.
(c) This order directs review and documentation. It does not presume that any official, agency, or contractor has acted unlawfully, and nothing in it shall be construed as a finding of wrongdoing.
SEC. 2.Definitions.
For purposes of this order:
(a) Agency means an executive agency as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105, excluding the Government Accountability Office. Independent regulatory agencies are covered only as provided in section 13(c).
(b) Covered arrangement means any contract, grant, cooperative agreement, other transaction, lease, license, partnership, charter, or reorganization under which a non-Federal party owns, operates, controls, or performs a function, asset, system, or data set on which an essential governmental function depends, or under which Federal assets or functions are transferred outside Federal ownership or control.
(c) Essential governmental function means a function that an agency is required by statute to perform, or that is necessary to protect life, safety, national security, public health, the continuity of government, or the delivery of statutory benefits, including any inherently governmental function and any critical function as described in OFPP Policy Letter 11-01.
(d) Operational control means the practical ability to direct how a function is performed day to day, including the ability to start, stop, configure, modify, or restore the systems and to direct the personnel performing it.
(e) Critical contractor dependency means a condition in which an agency could not continue an essential governmental function at the required level of service for the replacement period established under section 6(c) if a particular contractor ceased performance.
(f) Beneficial owner and controlling entity have the meanings given in the guidance issued under section 7(a), which shall, to the extent permitted by law, align with 31 U.S.C. 5336 and FAR 52.204-17.
(g) Classification means the ten-category Federal Privatization Classification System established under section 4.
SEC. 3.Federal Public Authority Review.
(a) There is established within the Office of Management and Budget a Federal Public Authority Review (the Review), to be led by the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy in coordination with the Deputy Director for Management.
(b) The Review shall examine covered arrangements in six phases: agency inventory; legal authority; ownership and control; operational dependence; public accountability; and remediation, as described in Part VII of the accompanying framework.
(c) The Review shall apply a standardized dependency risk methodology that measures operational dependence, public control, ownership concentration, security, continuity, and legal compliance, and that does not presume wrongdoing.
(d) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency shall designate a senior official, who shall be a career Senior Executive Service member where practicable, as the agency's Public Authority Review Official, and shall notify the Review.
SEC. 4.Government-Wide Contracting and Privatization Inventory.
(a) Within 30 days, OMB shall issue inventory guidance establishing the Federal Privatization Classification System, the attributes each agency must document for every covered arrangement, and data standards consistent with the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act and the DATA Act.
(b) Within 90 days, each agency shall submit to OMB a preliminary inventory of covered arrangements supporting essential governmental functions, prioritizing arrangements with an estimated total value above $50 million, a period of performance above five years, or a single-source or single-award structure.
(c) The inventory shall build on and be reconciled with the agency's inventory under the FAIR Act and its service contract inventory, and shall not duplicate information already reported where a cross-reference suffices.
SEC. 5.Review of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions.
(a) Within 90 days, each agency shall identify every covered arrangement in which contractor personnel perform functions that are inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental functions, or critical, and shall document the government officials who retain final decision authority over each.
(b) Where an agency cannot identify a properly authorized Federal official exercising final decision authority over a function that binds the public or commits Federal funds, the agency general counsel shall issue a written legal assessment within 90 days of that identification and shall notify the agency's Inspector General.
SEC. 6.Review of Essential Infrastructure Dependencies.
(a) Within 180 days, each agency shall assess, for each covered arrangement supporting an essential governmental function, whether the agency holds title, license, or access rights sufficient to inspect, operate, modify, and replace the relevant equipment, software, data, and communications infrastructure.
(b) Each assessment shall identify any proprietary technology, data format, or contract term that would prevent the agency from transferring the function to another provider or to Federal performance.
(c) Each agency shall establish, for each essential governmental function, a replacement period within which the function could be transitioned to another provider or to Federal performance without loss of required service, and shall identify any critical contractor dependency.
(d) Agencies shall prepare a corrective plan for each critical contractor dependency, which may include acquiring data rights, negotiating escrow or step-in provisions, developing internal capability, or competing future requirements.
SEC. 7.Contractor Ownership and Control Assessment.
(a) Within 90 days, OMB, in consultation with the General Services Administration, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense, shall issue guidance for assessing the ownership and control of contractors performing covered arrangements, using SAM.gov registration data, FAR 52.204-17 disclosures, Securities and Exchange Commission filings, Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System records, existing foreign ownership, control, or influence determinations, and other lawfully available records.
(b) The guidance shall distinguish direct ownership, indirect ownership, voting control, board appointment rights, contractual control, operational control, and passive minority investment, and shall state that shared institutional ownership, private equity sponsorship, or common investors are not evidence of misconduct.
(c) Within 180 days, agencies shall complete ownership and control assessments for covered arrangements in Track 2 and Track 3 and shall identify instances in which a single controlling entity holds covered arrangements supporting essential functions in more than one agency.
(d) The FAR Council and the FAA, each under its respective authority, shall within 180 days propose, through notice-and-comment procedures where required by 41 U.S.C. 1707 or other law, solicitation provisions requiring offerors for future covered arrangements supporting essential functions to disclose controlling entities and to notify the contracting officer of a change in control. Nothing in this subsection modifies an existing contract except by mutual agreement or as the contract permits.
SEC. 8.Public Transparency Reporting.
(a) Within 365 days, OMB shall publish an initial Federal Public-Control and Privatization Report identifying, by agency, the classification, legal authority, ownership at the controlling-entity level, dependency rating, and corrective-action status of covered arrangements supporting essential governmental functions.
(b) OMB and GSA shall develop a Federal Public Authority Transparency Portal consistent with Part X of the accompanying framework, using existing systems including USAspending.gov and SAM.gov to the maximum extent practicable.
(c) Agencies shall withhold information that is classified, that is exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552, that is protected by 41 U.S.C. 4702 or 18 U.S.C. 1905, that would create a security vulnerability, or whose release is otherwise prohibited by law. Confidentiality shall not be asserted for the purpose of concealing an arrangement from public view or avoiding embarrassment.
SEC. 9.Coordination.
(a) OMB shall coordinate the Review. GSA shall support data systems and acquisition guidance. The Office of Personnel Management shall support workforce analysis under section 11. The Department of Justice, through the Office of Legal Counsel, shall advise on legal questions referred under sections 5 and 6. The Department of Homeland Security, through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, shall advise on cybersecurity and critical-infrastructure dependencies. The Federal Acquisition Security Council shall advise on supply-chain risk.
(b) The Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall conduct the pilot review described in section 14.
SEC. 10.Inspectors General and Whistleblower Safeguards.
(a) Agencies shall provide their Inspectors General with full and prompt access to all records, data, and personnel relevant to the Review, consistent with 5 U.S.C. 406.
(b) Nothing in this order directs, limits, or supervises any Inspector General audit, investigation, or report. Matters suggesting possible misconduct identified during the Review shall be referred to the appropriate Inspector General rather than resolved by the Review.
(c) No agency official shall take or threaten a personnel action, or direct a contractor to take or threaten an action, against any Federal employee or contractor employee because that person provided information to the Review, an Inspector General, Congress, or the Office of Special Counsel, consistent with 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8) and 41 U.S.C. 4712.
SEC. 11.Worker and Public Consultation.
(a) Before finalizing any corrective plan that would transfer a function between Federal and contractor performance, an agency shall consult affected Federal employees, their exclusive representatives where applicable, affected contractor employees, and affected communities, and shall publish a summary of the comments received and the agency's response.
(b) OPM shall, within 180 days, provide agencies with guidance on retaining institutional knowledge, offering training, and protecting employee rights during any such transition.
(c) Agencies shall ensure meaningful human oversight of any artificial-intelligence-enabled system used to perform or support an essential governmental function, consistent with the American Worker Protection and Human-AI Collaboration Policy.
SEC. 12.National Security Protections.
Nothing in this order requires the disclosure of classified information, sources and methods, or information whose release would harm national security, critical infrastructure, or public safety. The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense may establish procedures for the classified annex of any report under section 8.
SEC. 13.Implementation Deadlines and Scope.
(a) Deadlines: 30-day mobilization (sections 3(d), 4(a)); 90-day preliminary inventory and functions review (sections 4(b), 5, 7(a)); 180-day interim assessment (sections 6, 7(c), 7(d), 11(b)); 365-day initial public report (section 8(a)).
(b) Each agency shall report its progress to OMB at each deadline.
(c) Independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5), are requested, and not directed, to participate in the Review and to apply its methods to their own covered arrangements.
SEC. 14.FAA and Air Traffic Control Pilot.
(a) Within 180 days, the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator shall complete an ownership-and-control map of the National Airspace System modernization program, covering equipment, software, facilities, communications networks, operational data, workforce, and decision authority, consistent with Part VI of the accompanying framework and the FAA Acquisition Management System.
(b) The pilot shall be completed and reported to OMB within 365 days, with lessons incorporated into the government-wide methodology.
SEC. 15.Budget and Administrative Provisions.
Agencies shall carry out this order using existing resources and appropriations to the extent available. The Director of OMB shall identify in the next President's Budget any additional resources needed for the Review and the Portal.
SEC. 16.General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof, or the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including 49 U.S.C. 40110 and 40122 for the FAA, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) Nothing in this order modifies any existing contract except as the contract permits or by mutual agreement, and nothing in this order directs any action against a private party outside the terms of its contract and applicable law.
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
What this order can and cannot do
| Requirement | Executive order alone | Requires legislation or appropriations |
|---|---|---|
| Inventories, classification, and dependency assessments in executive agencies | Yes | No |
| Agency legal reviews and Inspector General referrals | Yes | No |
| New solicitation terms for future contracts | Yes, through FAR and FAA AMS processes, including notice and comment where required | No, though legislation would make the terms durable |
| Modifying existing contracts | Only by mutual agreement or as the contract permits | Statutory change could not impair vested contract rights without compensation |
| Binding independent regulatory agencies | No; participation is requested | Yes |
| Mandatory individual beneficial-ownership disclosure by domestic contractors | Limited to what solicitation terms can require | Yes, for a durable and uniform requirement |
| A private right of action or judicial review provision | No; the order expressly creates no enforceable rights | Yes |
| Restructuring a statutory agency, including separating the ATO | No | Yes |
| Funding the Review and the Portal beyond existing resources | No | Yes |
Part VI
Part VI - FAA and Air Traffic Control Pilot Investigation
Why the FAA is the pilot
Air traffic control is the clearest test of the method. The FAA's Air Traffic Organization operates one of the largest air navigation services in the world. It already relies on long-standing, authorized contractor arrangements, including the Contract Tower Program created in 1982. It is now in the middle of the largest modernization effort in decades, managed through a prime integrator, a contractor-provided telecommunications backbone, and billions of dollars in new appropriations and requests. And the public record contains enough contracts, audits, and announcements to test every phase of the review.
The purpose of the pilot is to find out what is true. It is not to prove that the FAA is being privatized. The FAA is also moving some functions in the other direction, including a 2026 pilot that brings selected contract towers into FAA operation, and the review must record that evidence with the same care.
Current FAA governance and statutory responsibilities
- The FAA is an administration within the Department of Transportation established under 49 U.S.C. 106.
- Under 49 U.S.C. 40103, the United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States, and the Administrator develops plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assigns its use to ensure safety and efficient use.
- The Air Traffic Organization is the FAA line of business that provides air traffic services. It was created as a distinct performance-based unit in 2000 by executive order and remains inside the FAA.
- Under 49 U.S.C. 40110(d), the FAA acquires most goods and services through its own Acquisition Management System rather than the FAR.
- Under 49 U.S.C. 40122, the FAA operates its own personnel management system, including collective bargaining with its employees' exclusive representatives.
- Under 49 U.S.C. 47124, Congress authorizes and funds the Contract Tower Program.
The modernization program as documented
| Item | What the public record shows | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) | Announced by the Secretary of Transportation on May 8, 2025, as a plan to replace aging ATC hardware and software with a target of substantial completion by 2028. | Holland and Knight, April 27, 2026 (Appendix A, source 9) |
| Initial appropriation | The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed July 4, 2025, provided $12.5 billion for air traffic control modernization in specified categories. | Holland and Knight (source 9); DOT letter (source 1) |
| Prime integrator | On December 4, 2025, DOT and the FAA announced Peraton as prime integrator for BNATCS under a performance-based contract. Peraton is privately held and has been owned since 2017 by the private equity firm Veritas Capital. | AIN, Dec. 5, 2025 (source 11); Wikipedia and Washington Technology (sources 12, 13) |
| Telecommunications backbone | The legacy FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) contract was first awarded to Harris Corporation, now L3Harris, in 2002. Its successor, FAA Enterprise Network Services (FENS), was awarded to Verizon in March 2023 as a 15-year contract of up to $2.4 billion. On August 11, 2026, the FAA awarded AT&T an undefinitized single-award IDIQ contract (693KA8-26-D-00016) with a $74.3 million initial task order to lead FENS, with Verizon moving to a supporting role. | Washington Technology (sources 14, 15); award record (source 16) |
| GAO findings | On September 14, 2026, GAO reported that BNATCS lacked a reliable lifecycle cost estimate and an integrated master schedule and that phase 1 was estimated at $10.6 billion. DOT partially concurred with both recommendations. | GAO-26-107992 (source 4) |
| Ground stop | On November 13, 2026, the FAA issued a nationwide ground stop. The FAA states that legacy equipment became unstable when data began flooding the FTI network, affecting 17 of 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. The investigation was ongoing at the time of the FAA's November 15 statement. | FAA (source 3) |
| New request | On November 17, 2026, DOT, OMB, and FAA requested $50.1 billion from the Appropriations Committees, including $10.1 billion for ATC modernization technology and $10 billion each for airport infrastructure, a terminal pilot program, up to five consolidated en route centers, and up to 140 FAA-owned towers. The letter does not address ownership, contractor roles, or governance. | DOT letter (source 1) |
| Contract towers | According to a March 2026 DOT Inspector General report as described by AVweb, the Contract Tower Program included 266 towers staffed by more than 1,500 controllers and was about 18 percent understaffed as of April 2025. FAA describes contract towers as 51 percent of federal ATC towers. On May 18, 2026, FAA announced a pilot under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 to transition selected high-activity contract towers to FAA staffing. | FAA (sources 7, 17); AVweb (source 18) |
Project 2025 aviation recommendations
Chapter 19 of Mandate for Leadership 2025 recommends, at pages 632 to 634, that the next administration separate the FAA from DOT or, at a minimum, separate the ATO from the FAA; restructure FAA funding so it is not dependent on annual appropriations; require the FAA to operate more like a business; move the ATO to headquarters outside the District of Columbia; shift from aviation user taxes to fees paid directly to the ATO; and allow the ATO to issue long-term revenue bonds. The chapter describes these as organizational changes requiring legislation and cites air navigation providers in Canada and Europe as models. It does not use the word privatize.
Pilot chronology
Each event is labeled by what kind of evidence it is. A proposal is never treated as an implemented transfer.
| Date | Event | Evidence category | Status label |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1982 | FAA Contract Tower Program established | Implemented operational change (long-standing, authorized) | Verified |
| 2002 | FTI telecommunications contract awarded to Harris Corp. (now L3Harris) | Executed contract | Verified |
| March 2023 | FENS awarded to Verizon (15 years, up to $2.4 billion) | Executed contract | Verified |
| April 2023 | Mandate for Leadership 2025 published, including FAA/ATO restructuring recommendations | Policy proposal | Verified as proposal; implementation not established |
| May 16, 2024 | FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 enacted, directing a contract tower conversion pilot | Enacted legislation | Verified |
| May 8, 2025 | BNATCS announced | Official announcement | Verified |
| July 4, 2025 | $12.5 billion provided for ATC modernization | Appropriated funding | Verified |
| December 4, 2025 | Peraton selected as BNATCS prime integrator | Executed contract | Verified; contract terms to be obtained |
| May 18, 2026 | FAA pilot to move selected contract towers to FAA staffing | Implemented operational change (toward federal operation) | Verified |
| August 11, 2026 | AT&T awarded FENS lead role; Verizon to supporting role | Executed contract | Verified; definitized terms to be obtained |
| August 2026 | Press reports of FAA concerns about the prime integrator's performance | Reported, not adjudicated | Unverified |
| September 14, 2026 | GAO-26-107992 issued | Official oversight finding | Verified |
| November 13, 2026 | Nationwide ground stop linked by FAA to legacy equipment on the FTI network | Documented service disruption | Verified as disruption; root cause under investigation |
| November 17, 2026 | $50.1 billion request sent to Appropriations Committees | Official announcement (request, not appropriation) | Verified |
| Not established | That ATC is being allowed to deteriorate in order to justify privatization | Unresolved allegation | Under investigation; no evidence identified to date |
Ownership-and-control map
The map below records what is publicly known and what the pilot must verify. Provisional classifications will change if contract documents show otherwise.
| Layer | What is publicly known | Provisional classification | What the pilot must verify |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equipment (radars, radios, automation hardware) | FAA owns most NAS facilities and many systems; the new request funds up to 140 FAA-owned towers. | C-1 or C-3 | Title to new equipment acquired under BNATCS; whether any is leased or provided as a service |
| Software (automation platform, controller workstations) | The request includes $7.2 billion for a common automation platform and common controller workstations. | Not yet classifiable | Who owns the code; license terms; escrow; ability to modify and recompete |
| Facilities | ARTCCs, TRACONs, and FAA towers are FAA facilities; contract towers are airport-owned facilities staffed by contractors. | C-1 (FAA facilities); C-2 or C-3 (contract towers) | Ownership of new consolidated centers, including land acquisition terms |
| Communications networks | FTI (L3Harris, since 2002) and FENS (AT&T lead, Verizon support, from 2026) carry NAS data and voice. | Likely C-5 for essential function | Whether the network is contractor-owned and delivered as a service; government step-in and data rights; transition plan from FTI |
| Operational data | Not addressed in the public record reviewed. | Not yet classifiable | Who holds and can export flight, surveillance, and system-health data |
| Workforce | FAA employs controllers at FAA facilities; contractor employees staff contract towers; integrator and vendor staff support modernization. | C-2 for contract towers under statute | Roles of integrator staff in decisions; whether any perform inherently governmental functions |
| Decision authority | FAA retains authority over airspace and safety by statute; press reports describe FAA retaining significant control over individual projects. | Government-held, to be confirmed | Delegations in the integrator contract; who approves design, schedule, and acceptance |
Modernization versus privatization
The pilot will apply one test throughout: modernization changes the tools; privatization changes who owns, controls, or decides. A new radar owned by the FAA is modernization. A new network the FAA cannot see into, cannot operate, and cannot replace without the vendor is a dependency. A contractor making binding decisions about the use of airspace would be a transfer of sovereign authority. These are different things and must be recorded differently.
Policy options to be assessed
The pilot will compare four structural options against transparent criteria. The assessment below is a starting framework; it does not predetermine the outcome, which will depend on the evidence gathered.
| Option | Description | Accountability and legal authority | Replaceability and cost transparency | Safety, workforce, and speed considerations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Continued federal ownership and operation | FAA owns and operates; contractors build and maintain under FAA direction. | Strongest; no new legislation needed | Depends on data and software rights obtained in contracts | Preserves current workforce structure; modernization pace depends on appropriations |
| B. Enhanced federal procurement | Option A plus open architecture, government-owned data and interfaces, source-code escrow, and multiple-award competition. | Strong; mostly achievable under existing AMS authority | Strongest replaceability; higher upfront contracting effort | Requires FAA acquisition and engineering capacity |
| C. Limited outsourcing | Expand contractor-owned or contractor-operated services for selected functions, such as networks or additional contract towers. | Lawful under existing authority if decisions stay with FAA; requires dependency safeguards | Can lower upfront cost; risk of lock-in without step-in and data rights | Existing contract tower staffing gaps must be weighed |
| D. Alternative organizational structures | Separate the ATO into a government corporation or a non-profit air navigation service provider funded by user fees, as some other countries have done. | Requires legislation; raises appointments, oversight, and sovereignty questions | Fee-based funding changes the role of appropriations; asset transfer terms are decisive | Major transition risk; supporters cite faster modernization abroad |
Pilot evidence requests
- The BNATCS prime integrator contract, statement of work, delegations, data-rights clauses, and acceptance authority.
- The FENS award documents, the FTI-to-FENS transition plan, and network ownership and step-in terms.
- Software licensing and escrow terms for the common automation platform.
- The ATO's assessment of which functions it could operate without each major contractor.
- FAA records of the root-cause investigation into the November 13, 2026 ground stop.
- Contract Tower Program staffing, safety, and cost data, and results of the 2026 conversion pilot.
- DOT Inspector General and GAO workpapers available to Congress.
Part VII
Part VII - Government-Wide Audit Methodology and Dependency Risk Model
The six phases
| Phase | Question | Key inputs | Output |
|---|---|---|---|
| I. Agency inventory | What functions, assets, systems, and contractors does the agency rely on? | FAIR Act and service contract inventories, USAspending.gov, SAM.gov, agency asset records | Classified inventory of covered arrangements |
| II. Legal authority | What statute, appropriation, regulation, directive, and contract authorize each arrangement? | Authorizing statutes, appropriations acts, delegations of authority, contract files | Authority record for each arrangement; gaps flagged for Track 3 |
| III. Ownership and control | Who owns and controls the contractor, and who controls the function in practice? | SAM.gov ownership fields, SEC filings, FOCI determinations, contract terms | Ownership-and-control profile (Part VIII) |
| IV. Operational dependence | Could the agency continue the function without the contractor? | Data rights, software licenses, staffing, transition plans, continuity plans | Dependency score and replacement period |
| V. Public accountability | Can auditors, Congress, and the public see and correct what is happening? | IG and GAO access, records schedules, FOIA posture, complaint channels | Accountability score |
| VI. Remediation | What should change? | Phases I through V | Corrective plan, legislative recommendation, or referral |
Dependency risk scoring
Each Track 2 and Track 3 arrangement is scored on six dimensions from 0 (no concern) to 4 (severe concern). Scores measure risk, not fault.
| Dimension | 0 | 2 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operational dependence | Government could transition within the replacement period using its own rights and staff | Transition possible with significant cost or delay | Government could not continue the function if the contractor stopped |
| Public control | Federal officials make every binding decision | Federal approval exists but depends on contractor analysis the government cannot verify | Contractor makes or effectively makes binding decisions |
| Concentration | Multiple qualified providers; no common control across agencies | Few providers or one controlling entity across two agencies | Single provider or one controlling entity across three or more agencies' essential functions |
| Security | Supply chain and foreign control reviewed and mitigated | Known gaps with mitigation underway | Unmitigated supply-chain or foreign-control risk |
| Continuity | Tested continuity and step-in plan | Untested plan | No plan or no step-in rights |
| Legal compliance | Authority documented and reviewed | Authority documented, review pending | Authority unclear or questioned |
Interpreting the score
- Total 0 to 6: low risk; record and monitor.
- Total 7 to 14: elevated risk; corrective plan within 180 days.
- Total 15 to 24, or any score of 4 in public control or legal compliance: high risk; Track 3 legal review and Inspector General notification.
- A high score is a signal to look closer. It is not a finding that anyone acted improperly.
Quality controls
- Two independent reviewers score each Track 3 arrangement; disagreements are resolved in writing.
- Agencies may submit a written response to any score before publication.
- Scoring rules are published in advance and applied identically across agencies and administrations.
- Arrangements created under earlier administrations of either party are reviewed under the same standard.
Part VIII
Part VIII - Beneficial-Ownership and Concentration Review
Purpose
To learn, through lawful means, who ultimately controls the companies operating essential public functions, and whether control is concentrated in ways that create conflicts of interest, weaken competition, or make the government dependent on a small number of owners.
Lawful data sources
- SAM.gov registration, including immediate owner and highest-level owner disclosures under FAR 52.204-17.
- Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System records.
- SEC filings for public companies and registered funds, including 10-K, proxy statements, Schedules 13D and 13G, and Form ADV for advisers.
- Foreign ownership, control, or influence determinations and mitigation agreements under 32 C.F.R. part 117, accessed by cleared personnel.
- State business registry records.
- New contract disclosures under section 7(d) of the executive order and section 301 of the Act.
- Voluntary disclosures and public statements by contractors.
Because domestic companies have been exempt from Corporate Transparency Act reporting since FinCEN's final rule effective August 14, 2026, there is no comprehensive federal database of domestic contractors' individual beneficial owners. The review must say so plainly and must not overstate what it can see.
What the review evaluates
ElementWhat is examined
01
Ownership chain
Each entity between the contractor and its highest-level owner
02
Private equity sponsor
Whether a fund or sponsor controls the contractor, and its other federal portfolio companies
03
Institutional ownership
Large passive holdings by index funds and asset managers
04
Voting control
Who holds a majority or blocking vote
05
Board appointment rights
Who appoints directors
06
Contractual control
Management agreements, vetoes, or consent rights
07
Common ownership across essential services
One controlling entity across multiple agencies' essential functions
08
Conflicts of interest
Whether a controlling entity also owns a party the contractor oversees or evaluates
09
Foreign ownership, control, or influence
Foreign governmental or private control
10
Related-party transactions
Payments between the contractor and its affiliates under the contract
11
Competitive bidding
Whether affiliated offerors competed against each other
Public disclosure rules
- Controlling entities of contractors performing essential functions are published.
- Individual beneficial owners are disclosed to the government, held confidentially, and not published.
- Proprietary financial information is protected under FOIA Exemption 4 and 41 U.S.C. 4702.
- Where broader disclosure would require new law, the review identifies the gap and recommends legislation rather than acting without authority.
Part IX
Part IX - Federal Workforce and Affected Worker Protection Plan
Principles
The people who operate public institutions understand their weaknesses first. Any change in who performs a public function, in either direction, must protect those workers, preserve what they know, and include them in the decision.
Protections
| Area | Protection |
|---|---|
| Federal employee displacement | Advance notice, right of first offer for comparable contractor positions, priority placement within the agency, and preservation of rights under chapter 71 of title 5 and 49 U.S.C. 40122. |
| Contractor employee treatment | Right of first refusal with a successor contractor or on return to federal performance; whistleblower coverage under 41 U.S.C. 4712 regardless of contract value. |
| Training and retraining | Agency-funded training for new systems before cutover; retraining for any employee whose role changes. |
| Wages and benefits | Workforce impact statements disclose effects on pay and benefits before any material change. |
| Labor representation | Consultation with exclusive representatives before corrective plans are finalized. |
| Workplace safety | Safety reviews before any change in staffing model for a safety-critical function. |
| Whistleblower rights | Protected channels to Inspectors General, the Office of Special Counsel, and Congress; no retaliation for cooperating with the Review. |
| Transition continuity | Overlap periods so incoming staff train alongside outgoing staff. |
| Institutional knowledge | Documented procedures, mentoring, and retention incentives for critical skills. |
| Human oversight of AI-enabled systems | No final exercise of sovereign authority by an automated system without a federal official able to override it, coordinated with the American Worker Protection and Human-AI Collaboration Policy. |
Required consultation
Before final adoption of any provision of this framework, the initiative will consult directly with federal employees, contractor employees, air traffic controllers and technicians, labor organizations, technical experts, and affected communities, using the process in Part XII.
Part XI
Part XI - Fiscal and Economic Impact Assessment
Approach
This assessment uses transparent planning assumptions so that Congress, the Congressional Budget Office, and the public can test and replace them. It does not present any savings as established. Where a cost cannot responsibly be estimated before the inventory exists, the assessment says so.
Planning assumptions
| Assumption | Low | Baseline | High | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Review staff across OMB and agencies (full-time equivalents, per year, for two years) | 120 | 250 | 500 | Scaled to the number of agencies and the share of arrangements expected to fall in Tracks 2 and 3; to be replaced by agency workload estimates |
| Fully loaded annual cost per FTE | $200,000 | $225,000 | $250,000 | Planning assumption for salary, benefits, and overhead; to be replaced by OPM and agency data |
| Added Inspector General capacity (per year) | $10 million | $25 million | $50 million | Planning assumption; IGs should provide their own estimates |
| Portal build (one time) | $8 million | $15 million | $30 million | Planning assumption based on reuse of USAspending.gov and SAM.gov |
| Portal operations (per year) | 20 percent of build | 20 percent of build | 20 percent of build | Planning assumption |
Two-year cost scenarios
| Component | Low | Baseline | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| Review personnel (2 years) | $48.0 million | $112.5 million | $250.0 million |
| Inspector General capacity (2 years) | $20.0 million | $50.0 million | $100.0 million |
| Portal build plus first-year operations | $9.6 million | $18.0 million | $36.0 million |
| Total, first two years | $77.6 million | $180.5 million | $386.0 million |
These totals are arithmetic results of the assumptions above, not estimates of what Congress will appropriate.
Costs not yet estimated
- Contractor compliance costs for new disclosure and data-rights terms. These will depend on contract size and existing systems and should be estimated in the regulatory impact analysis for any FAR or AMS rule.
- Insourcing costs, where the review recommends returning a function to federal performance. These cannot be estimated until specific arrangements are identified.
- Costs of maintaining government-operated alternatives or backup capability for critical dependencies.
- Cybersecurity and disaster-recovery improvements identified by the review.
Potential savings mechanisms, not claimed as savings
- Data rights and open interfaces that allow future recompetition instead of sole-source renewal.
- Earlier detection of cost and schedule risk. GAO's September 2026 report on BNATCS warned of the risk of repeating a history of overruns where lifecycle cost estimates are missing.
- Avoided emergency costs from continuity planning.
Economic effects
- Competition and innovation: open architecture and data portability can lower barriers for new and small firms. Additional terms can also raise bid costs, which the rulemaking must weigh.
- Small businesses: thresholds in the Act exclude most small awards; the rulemaking should include a small business impact analysis.
- Long-term taxpayer exposure: the largest exposure is not the cost of the review but the cost of discovering dependency during a failure.
Part XII
Part XII - Public Participation and Consultation Plan
Who will be consulted
- Federal employees, including air traffic controllers, technicians, engineers, inspectors, and acquisition staff.
- Contractor employees, including contract tower controllers and modernization program staff.
- Labor representatives.
- Small businesses and other contractors.
- Aviation, telecommunications, and infrastructure experts.
- Procurement and constitutional law specialists.
- Government accountability organizations across the political spectrum.
- Taxpayers, travelers, rural and small airport communities, and other affected users.
How
| Stage | Activity | Timing |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Publication | This packet published for comment with a plain-language summary. | At release |
| 2. Listening sessions | Regional and virtual sessions, with accessible formats and interpretation. | First 90 days |
| 3. Workforce sessions | Separate sessions for federal and contractor employees, with labor organizations. | First 90 days |
| 4. Expert review | Written review by procurement, constitutional, aviation, and cybersecurity experts. | Days 60 to 150 |
| 5. Revision | Published response to every substantive category of comment and a revised draft. | Days 150 to 180 |
| 6. Hearings | Public hearings on the revised draft before final executive or legislative action. | After day 180 |
Protected submission channels
- A secure web form and mailing address for written comments.
- A separate channel for people who wish to report possible wrongdoing, which refers them to the appropriate Inspector General, the Office of Special Counsel, or Congress. A campaign cannot itself grant whistleblower protection, and submitters are told so.
Privacy notice and evidence handling
- Submitters are told how their information will be used, who will see it, and how long it will be kept.
- Submitters are warned not to send classified information, records obtained unlawfully, passwords or credentials, or other people's private information.
- Submissions are logged, acknowledged, and stored with access limited to designated staff.
- No public submission is treated as a verified allegation. Submissions are leads to be checked against records.
Response tracking
Every category of comment receives a published response stating what changed, what did not, and why.
Part XIII
Part XIII - Implementation Roadmap and Agency Responsibilities
Timeline
| When | Milestone |
|---|---|
| Transition period | Legal review of this packet; agency briefings; identification of Public Authority Review Officials; FAA pilot planning |
| Day 1 | Executive order signed |
| Day 30 | Review mobilized; inventory guidance issued; agency officials designated |
| Day 90 | Preliminary inventories; inherently governmental and critical functions review; ownership assessment guidance |
| Day 180 | Interim dependency assessments; ownership assessments for Tracks 2 and 3; proposed solicitation terms; FAA ownership-and-control map |
| Day 365 | Initial public Federal Public-Control and Privatization Report; FAA pilot report; portal launch |
| Year 1 | Federal Public Authority and Privatization Accountability Act of 2029 introduced with bipartisan sponsors |
| Year 2 | Corrective plans implemented; second annual report |
| Year 3 | First Comptroller General review of implementation |
Agency responsibilities
| Agency | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Office of Management and Budget | Leads the Review; issues guidance; publishes the annual report |
| Office of Federal Procurement Policy | Classification system; ownership guidance; concentration assessment |
| General Services Administration | SAM.gov and USAspending.gov integration; portal build and operation |
| Office of Personnel Management | Workforce analysis and transition guidance |
| Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel | Legal opinions on referred questions |
| Department of Homeland Security, CISA | Cybersecurity and critical-infrastructure dependency advice |
| Federal Acquisition Security Council | Supply-chain and foreign-control risk advice |
| FAR Council and FAA | Proposed solicitation terms through required rulemaking |
| Department of Transportation and FAA | Air traffic control pilot |
| Inspectors General | Independent audits and investigations; access to all records |
| Every executive agency | Inventory, classification, dependency assessment, corrective plans |
Part XIV
Part XIV - Press Release
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE · NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Cordova 2028 Releases Plan to Find Out Who Owns and Controls the Federal Government's Essential Functions
A draft executive order, draft legislation, and an FAA pilot review would separate ordinary contracting from the transfer of public authority, and publish the results.
MANTECA, Calif. — Cordova 2028 today released the Federal Public Authority, Privatization Transparency, and Accountability Initiative, a governing framework to determine what has been privatized across federal agencies, who owns and controls the contractors running essential public functions, and whether the government could still operate those functions on its own.
The release comes one day after the Department of Transportation, the Office of Management and Budget, and the FAA asked Congress for $50.1 billion to modernize air traffic control, and five days after a failure in legacy telecommunications equipment led to a nationwide ground stop.
The initiative includes a ten-category classification system that distinguishes ordinary procurement from contractor-owned infrastructure and the delegation of public authority; a day-one executive order with 30-, 90-, 180-, and 365-day deadlines; the Federal Public Authority and Privatization Accountability Act of 2029; a beneficial-ownership review; a public transparency portal; protections for federal and contractor workers; and a pilot investigation of FAA modernization.
"Private companies can help the government build and modernize. They should," said Vincent Cordova. "But what the public pays for, the public has to be able to see, run, replace, and answer for. This plan does not assume anyone has done anything wrong. It finds out what is true and publishes it, so the next generation inherits a government that still belongs to them."
The framework does not treat contracting, private equity, or shared ownership as evidence of wrongdoing, and does not assume that any Project 2025 proposal has been carried out. It identifies which steps can be taken by executive order and which require Congress, and it lists every legal question that requires independent review.
The campaign is inviting air traffic controllers, technicians, federal and contractor employees, labor organizations, and the public to review the draft and send corrections before it is finalized.
Contact: info@cordova2028.com · www.cordova2028.com
The published announcement is at cordova2028.com/press-release/cordova-2028-releases-plan-to-find-out-who-owns-and-controls-the-federal-government. On November 18, 2026, the campaign also sent a formal letter to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees requesting oversight of the $50.1 billion request; the announcement and full letter are at cordova2028.com/press-release/cordova-2028-asks-congress-for-oversight-of-the-50-billion-faa-modernization-request.
Part XV
Part XV - Frequently Asked Questions
Is this plan against private contractors?
No. Most federal contracting is ordinary procurement and stays that way. The plan focuses on arrangements where essential public functions depend on infrastructure, software, data, or decisions the government does not control.
Does the plan claim the FAA is being privatized?
No. The public record shows a large modernization program run with a prime integrator and contractor-provided networks, alongside long-standing contract towers and a 2026 pilot that moves some contract towers to FAA staffing. The pilot investigation exists to find out what is actually changing.
Does Project 2025 call for privatizing air traffic control?
The FAA section recommends separating the FAA from DOT or the ATO from the FAA, user fees paid directly to the ATO, revenue bonds, and operating more like a business. It describes these as changes requiring legislation and does not use the word privatize. Whether any have been implemented is a question of evidence.
Can a president privatize part of the government without a vote of Congress?
A president can direct agencies to use authority Congress already gave them, including contracting authority. A president cannot restructure a statutory agency, spend money Congress did not appropriate for that purpose, or give private parties unsupervised power to make binding public decisions. Those require Congress.
If an unlawful transfer happened, is it automatically void?
No. It can be challenged and set aside through proper legal channels by someone with standing, or corrected by the agency or Congress. It does not undo itself.
Will you publish who owns contractors?
The controlling entity of each contractor performing an essential function will be public. Individual owners' information would be collected confidentially by the government, not published.
Is private equity ownership a red flag?
Not by itself. Ownership is recorded and examined for concentration and conflicts. It is never treated as evidence of misconduct without more.
What happens to workers if a function changes hands?
Federal and contractor workers receive notice, consultation, rights of first offer or refusal, retraining, and whistleblower protection, in either direction of a transition.
What will this cost?
The two-year cost of the review and portal ranges from about $78 million to $386 million under the stated planning assumptions, with about $181 million in the baseline. Those figures are assumptions for Congress to test, not appropriations.
Could a future administration undo this?
An executive order can be revoked. That is why the plan includes legislation to make the core protections permanent.
How can I help shape it?
Read the draft, tell us what we missed, and if you work in these institutions, tell us what you see. Use the contact page at cordova2028.com.
Appendix A
Appendix A - Source Bibliography and Verification Register
Sources
Each source is listed with its date and its relevance to this packet. Sources were retrieved on November 18, 2026. Secondary sources are identified as such and should be confirmed against primary records before final publication.
- 1.
U.S. DOT, OMB, and FAA, Joint Letter Regarding Additional ATC Funding (November 17, 2026)
Primary. The $50.1 billion request and its five categories; recipients and signatories. Silent on ownership and contractor roles. Official source
- 2.
The Heritage Foundation, Mandate for Leadership 2025, Chapter 19, Department of Transportation (2023), pp. 632-634
Primary. Text of the FAA and ATO recommendations. Official source
- 3.
FAA, Nationwide Ground Stop: Questions and Answers (November 15, 2026)
Primary. FAA account of the November 13 ground stop and the FTI network. Official source
- 4.
U.S. GAO, Air Traffic Control Systems: Ambitious New Modernization Effort Needs to Improve Cost and Schedule Planning, GAO-26-107992 (September 14, 2026)
Primary. BNATCS cost and schedule findings and recommendations. Official source
- 5.
Congressional Research Service, The Private Nondelegation Doctrine, IF13307 (September 8, 2026)
Primary-adjacent legal summary. Doctrine, Carter Coal, Sunshine Anthracite, Consumers' Research, HISA litigation status. Official source
- 6.
Congressional Research Service, FCC v. Consumers' Research: High Court Rejects Challenge to Universal Service Fund, LSB11301 (updated July 18, 2025)
Legal summary of the 2025 decision. Official source
- 7.
FAA, Contract Tower Program (agency web page)
Primary. Program established 1982; share of federal towers. Official source
- 8.
Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 7.5, Inherently Governmental Functions (FAC 2026-01)
Primary. Prohibition on contracting inherently governmental functions and examples. Official source
- 9.
Holland and Knight, The BNATCS State of Play (April 27, 2026)
Secondary. May 8, 2025 announcement; July 4, 2025 appropriation. Official source
- 10.
GSA, Class Deviation for FAR Part 7 (Revolutionary FAR Overhaul)
Primary. Subpart 7.5 retained in the RFO model deviation. Official source
- 11.
AIN, FAA Awards ATC Upgrade Integration Contract to Peraton (December 5, 2025)
Secondary. Prime integrator selection announced December 4, 2025. Official source
- 12.
Washington Technology, Deal done: Perspecta now in the fold of Peraton (May 2021)
Secondary. Veritas Capital ownership of Peraton. Official source
- 13.
Washington Technology, Peraton wins air traffic control system overhaul contract (December 2025)
Secondary. Two bids received; phase one scope. Official source
- 14.
Washington Technology, FAA selects Verizon for $2.4B telecommunications contract (March 2023)
Secondary. FENS award and L3Harris FTI incumbency. Official source
- 15.
Washington Technology, FAA brings in AT&T for network modernization program (August 2026)
Secondary. AT&T lead role; Verizon supporting role. Official source
- 16.
Award record, FAA Enterprise Network Services, 693KA8-26-D-00016 (August 11, 2026)
Secondary aggregator of SAM.gov data. Confirm against SAM.gov and USAspending.gov. Official source
- 17.
FAA, New FAA Program Moves to Strengthen Controller Pipeline, Standardize Training (May 18, 2026)
Primary. Contract tower conversion pilot. Official source
- 18.
AVweb, FAA To Test Moving Contract Towers Into Agency Operation (May 2026)
Secondary. Describes March 2026 DOT Inspector General findings on contract tower staffing. Obtain the OIG report directly. Official source
- 19.
TravelPulse, Tensions Reportedly Rising Within Trump's FAA as Air Traffic Control Overhaul Hits a Snag (August 20, 2026)
Secondary report of a Politico story. Unverified; recorded as a lead only. Official source
- 20.
Ballard Spahr, FinCEN Permanently Exempts U.S. Entities and Persons from Beneficial Ownership Reporting (August 24, 2026)
Secondary legal alert. Final rule effective August 14, 2026. Confirm against the Federal Register. Official source
- 21.
Gibson Dunn, Supreme Court Rejects Nondelegation Challenge to the FCC Universal Service Fund (June 27, 2025)
Secondary. Holding on private nondelegation in Consumers' Research. Official source
- 22.
The White House (Clinton Administration), Fact Sheet on Actions to Improve Air Travel (December 7, 2000)
Primary historical. Creation of the Air Traffic Organization as a performance-based unit. Official source
- 23.
PBS NewsHour, Trump administration details its $50 billion request for aviation system improvements (November 17, 2026)
Secondary. Context for the request, including the earlier $30.1 billion figure. Official source
Verification register
| Claim | Source | Status |
|---|---|---|
| DOT, OMB, and FAA requested $50.1 billion on November 17, 2026, in five categories | 1 | Verified against primary |
| The request letter does not address ownership or contractor roles | 1 | Verified against primary |
| Project 2025 recommends separating the FAA from DOT or the ATO from the FAA, user fees, revenue bonds, and operating like a business, pp. 632-634 | 2 | Verified against a copy of the primary text; confirm pagination against the official PDF |
| Project 2025 describes these as changes requiring legislation and does not use the word privatize in that section | 2 | Verified against a copy of the primary text |
| Nationwide ground stop on November 13, 2026, linked by FAA to legacy equipment on the FTI network, affecting 17 of 22 ARTCCs | 3 | Verified against primary; root cause investigation ongoing |
| GAO found no reliable lifecycle cost estimate or integrated master schedule for BNATCS; phase 1 at $10.6 billion | 4 | Verified against primary highlights; confirm figures in full report |
| Peraton selected as BNATCS prime integrator, announced December 4, 2025 | 11, 13 | Secondary; obtain award documents |
| Peraton is owned by Veritas Capital | 12 | Secondary; confirm through SAM.gov highest-level owner field |
| FTI awarded to Harris Corp. in 2002; FENS to Verizon in 2023; AT&T lead role August 11, 2026 | 14, 15, 16 | Secondary; confirm against SAM.gov and FAA records |
| Contract Tower Program established 1982; 51 percent of federal towers | 7 | Verified against primary |
| Contract towers: 266 towers, more than 1,500 controllers, about 18 percent understaffed as of April 2025 | 18 | Secondary description of OIG report; obtain report |
| FAA pilot to transition selected contract towers to FAA staffing announced May 18, 2026 | 17 | Verified against primary |
| FAR Subpart 7.5 retained under the Revolutionary FAR Overhaul | 8, 10 | Verified against primary |
| FCC v. Consumers' Research, decided June 27, 2025, 6-3, rejected private nondelegation challenge because the FCC retained final authority | 5, 6, 21 | Verified against legal summaries; confirm against slip opinion |
| Domestic companies exempt from CTA reporting under a FinCEN final rule effective August 14, 2026 | 20 | Secondary; confirm against the Federal Register |
| Press reports of FAA concerns about the prime integrator | 19 | Unverified; lead only |
| That public institutions are being deliberately allowed to deteriorate to justify privatization | None | Unverified allegation; no supporting evidence identified |
Appendix B
Appendix B - Legal and Factual Issues Requiring Expert Review
Constitutional and statutory questions
- Whether 3 U.S.C. 301, 31 U.S.C. 1111, 40 U.S.C. 121, and 41 U.S.C. 1121 together support each directive in the draft executive order, and whether any additional authority should be cited.
- How 49 U.S.C. 40110(d) limits the application of FAR-based directives to the FAA, and which FAA Acquisition Management System provisions are the correct equivalents.
- Whether section 204 of the draft Act (prohibited delegations) is appropriately narrow, and whether its savings clause adequately protects existing authorized programs such as 49 U.S.C. 47124.
- Whether the definition of beneficial owner in section 103(5), cross-referencing 31 U.S.C. 5336 while overriding its exemptions for this Act, is drafted correctly.
- Whether section 301(c)'s confidentiality provision qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)(B), which requires specific citation for statutes enacted after the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009.
- Whether section 703's judicial review provision creates any standing, sovereign-immunity, or continuity-of-service problems, and whether its limits are sufficient.
- Whether emergency step-in rights in section 403 raise takings or contract-law issues for contractor-owned property, and how compensation should be set.
- The current status of HISA private nondelegation litigation and any Supreme Court action after September 2026.
- Whether any of the workforce protections conflict with 49 U.S.C. 40122, chapter 71 of title 5, or executive orders in effect on collective bargaining.
- Appropriations law questions for any transfer of function funded from accounts appropriated for other purposes.
Factual questions
- Obtain and review the BNATCS prime integrator contract, including delegations, data rights, and acceptance authority.
- Confirm the ownership and delivery model of the FTI network and the planned FENS network, including whether either is contractor-owned and delivered as a service.
- Confirm Peraton's highest-level owner through SAM.gov and any FOCI determinations.
- Obtain the March 2026 DOT Inspector General report on the Contract Tower Program.
- Obtain the final FAA root-cause analysis of the November 13, 2026 ground stop.
- Confirm whether any portion of the $12.5 billion has been or is proposed to be transferred between categories, and under what authority.
- Confirm current FAIR Act inventory and service contract inventory practices across agencies.
- Replace every fiscal planning assumption in Part XI with agency, OPM, and CBO estimates.
Required reviewers
- House or Senate Office of Legislative Counsel.
- Congressional Budget Office.
- Office of Legal Counsel and agency general counsels, upon transition.
- Independent constitutional and procurement-law counsel.
- Inspectors General and GAO, on oversight provisions.
- Federal and contractor labor organizations, on workforce provisions.
- Cybersecurity and aviation safety experts, on the FAA pilot and portal.
Your turn
What did we miss?
Every provision in this packet is open to correction by the people who operate these institutions and the people who depend on them. Send us what is wrong, what is missing, and what you see that the public record does not.