Wartime communications · Ukraine and the world
No Company Should Decide Whether a Country Can Communicate During War
No country’s communication should ever be limited or controlled in a way that could cripple its sovereignty.
By Vincent Cordova · Cordova 2028 · November 21, 2026

Being able to ask for help
A parent
waiting for an evacuation warning during an attack.
A hospital
that needs to reach a receiving facility.
An emergency worker
who has to tell a neighborhood where it can find shelter.
Picture a parent waiting for an evacuation warning during an attack. A hospital needs to reach a receiving facility. An emergency worker has to tell a neighborhood where it can find shelter. In those moments, communications are as basic as being able to ask for help.
That is why I want to know who can restrict the systems people depend on during war. And when a U.S. company controls an essential service abroad, I believe the American public has a responsibility to examine how that power is used.
The principle
No country’s communication should ever be limited or controlled in a way that could cripple its sovereignty.
Many networks. Still one point of failure.
Ukraine shows how much can depend on a single provider, even in a country with several networks. Ukrainians use mobile and fixed broadband alongside satellite service. When ground infrastructure is damaged or unavailable, a portable satellite connection can keep people and institutions connected.23
Mobile networks
Several operators, with national roaming
Fixed broadband
Ground lines that rely on power and access
Portable satellite
Keeps people connected when ground lines are down
Some military operations
Rely heavily on SpaceX services
Some Ukrainian military operations also rely heavily on SpaceX services. A restriction affecting those military users can have consequences for civilians, especially when Ukraine says it is trying to protect homes and critical infrastructure.1
What happened, and what is still disputed
- 2022KhersonReported
Reuters reported that Elon Musk ordered Starlink coverage cut in areas including Kherson during a Ukrainian counteroffensive.4
Those distinctions matter. So do the questions the public still deserves answered.
Who asked for each change?
Who authorized it?
What did the contract say?
Who financed the service?
Did any funder or government use that relationship to exert pressure?
What did the people making decisions know about the possible consequences?
The same questions, for every power
I would apply those questions to my own administration, too.
A future president
should never be able to use a country’s reliance on essential communications to demand political favor.
A foreign government
should never be able to use a country’s reliance on essential communications to demand political favor.
A private company
should never be able to use a country’s reliance on essential communications to demand political favor.
A future president, a foreign government, or a private company should never be able to use a country’s reliance on essential communications to demand political favor. The country and communities affected should have a voice in how their systems are governed and a backup they can actually use.
The country and communities affected should have a voice in how their systems are governed and a backup they can actually use.
Ukraine and every country that relies on one provider
I invite Ukraine and other countries that rely on a single provider for essential services to help lead this discussion. First, we need to listen to the people who have had to improvise when systems went down and make a list together: which services depend on one provider, what backup exists, and what gaps people experienced.
- STEP 1
Listen
Hear from the people who had to improvise when systems went down.
- STEP 2
List
Which services depend on one provider, what backup exists, and what gaps people experienced.
- STEP 3
Validate
Affected partners help build and confirm that list before the proposal is complete.
- STEP 4
Test
The list guides real tests of backups that people can actually use.
- STEP 5
Safeguard
It shapes the U.S. contract safeguards to pursue if elected.
We can only complete this proposal after affected partners have helped build and validate that list. It will guide the backup tests and U.S. contract safeguards I would pursue if elected.
Help build the list
Share general observations through the campaign contact page. Keep sensitive locations, network details, and identifying information out of submissions.
When service is cut and an attack follows
And when an essential service is deliberately restricted and an attack follows, my administration will seek to preserve the evidence and investigate.
Harm
What harm can be traced to the interruption.
Reason
Why the decision was made.
Power
Who had the power to make it.
Investigators should determine what harm can be traced to the interruption, why the decision was made, and who had the power to make it. If the evidence supports a possible war crime, we will pursue lawful accountability, including submitting information to the ICC Prosecutor where U.S. law permits. Where justified cooperation is barred, we will ask Congress to change the law.8910
The question before every nation
What should we do when communication is controlled and shut off, while our own species is screaming for help, and we cannot hear them?
The initiative sets out what we need to accomplish, why no country’s communication should ever be limited or controlled, what happens if the world ignores this, and where we propose to start. We do not have every answer. You may.
Start with a question any family can answer
If the network you depend on goes down tonight, can you still call for help?
No. The primary network is down and nothing independent is ready. The call does not go through.
An illustration of why a second, independent path matters. It does not model any real network.
Every country deserves the ability to answer yes.
— Vincent Cordova
Independent Candidate for President of the United States, 2028
Moving Forward Together.
Sources
- 1.Associated Press, reporting on Ukraine’s account of Starshield restrictions, November 2026
- 2.GSMA, Ukraine: national roaming and mobile operators
- 3.SkyCommons Observatory, Ukraine Country Report, 2026
- 4.Reuters investigation, “Musk ordered shutdown of Starlink satellite service as Ukraine retook territory from Russia,” July 25, 2025
- 5.The Washington Post, correction on the Crimea account, September 2023
- 6.U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member Shaheen and Senator Coons demand Elon Musk preserve documents regarding Ukraine’s access to Starlink and Starshield (release and letter)
- 7.Ars Technica, “Ukraine says SpaceX Starshield is restricted again; SpaceX claims it isn’t,” November 2026
- 8.Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2025 edition)
- 9.22 U.S.C. § 7423, prohibition on cooperation with the International Criminal Court
- 10.22 U.S.C. § 7433, assistance to international efforts
Editorial note: numbered source links replace the plain-text source names in the original post. The moment cards, network board, dated record with its reported, corrected and disputed labels, question cards, five-step path, and call test were added by the campaign design team to make the argument easier to follow. The call test is an illustration and does not model any real network. The principle at the top of the page states the campaign’s position.
Further reading
Keep Essential Communications Working During War
The World Goals initiative →
The press release
An invitation to Ukraine and other countries →
The One Species Compact
One standard for every nation →
A Global Letter on War Crimes
An invitation to file charges →
Who Owns Our Government?
The public deserves to know who controls essential functions →
Live tracker: Ukraine
The record, the denials, and the unanswered questions →