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Open discussion · Ukraine is the first case

Keep Essential Communications Working During War

Every country should be able to keep essential services working through war, even if its largest provider fails or withdraws service.

The principle

No country’s communication should ever be limited or controlled in a way that could cripple its sovereignty.

When a family needs an evacuation warning or a hospital needs to coordinate an emergency transfer, losing communications can cost lives. A nation that cannot warn, call, treat, or reach its own people cannot govern itself. No company, no foreign government, and no U.S. president should hold that switch.

Live tracker

Last updated

Ukraine: the restrictions, the denials, and the questions still unanswered

The headlines have moved on. The war has not. This tracker keeps the record in one place, dated and sourced, and says who is making each claim. It will be updated as answers come in, or fail to.

Status now

Restrictions reported by Ukraine are unresolved

As of November 21, 2026, we found no public report that the restrictions Ukraine reported on November 12 have been lifted, and no public account of who authorized them. SpaceX says it changed nothing. The Pentagon denies a policy change. Ukraine says the cap is systematic and is letting Russian drones reach its power grid as winter begins.

  1. October 13–14, 2026Ukraine

    A speed cap appears without notice

    Ukrainian forces detect that Starshield terminals lose connection when moving faster than about 161 km/h (100 mph). The cap affects the interceptor drones Ukraine uses against Russia’s jet-powered Shahed drones.12

  2. October 14–16, 2026SpaceX

    Musk says the U.S. government decides

    Elon Musk writes that Starshield is owned and controlled by the U.S. government and that limits are set “by the US military and ultimately POTUS.”13

  3. October 15, 2026Reporting

    Reuters: the order came from inside the White House

    Reuters reports, citing two U.S. officials and a Western official, that the order to limit the service came from inside the White House. The officials did not say who made the decision. Administration officials denied responsibility.31

  4. October 22, 2026Congress

    A Senate inquiry opens

    Sen. Richard Blumenthal, ranking member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, writes to Defense Secretary Hegseth and to SpaceX asking who has the technical and legal authority to change the service, with written answers due November 5 and a SpaceX briefing requested by November 12.45

  5. October 24, 2026Ukraine

    The cap is lifted, and the blame shifts

    Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense reports stable connectivity above 400 km/h. The same day, Musk accuses Ukraine of violating Starlink’s commercial terms of service, which Ukrainian officials deny.16

  6. November 5, 2026Ukraine

    “Nobody provided answers”

    Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires in Washington, Denys Sienik, says Kyiv has received no answers from the Pentagon, the White House or SpaceX, and wants talks on a replacement Starshield agreement. The current arrangement is expected to expire in mid-2027.78

  7. November 12, 2026Ukraine

    The restrictions return

    President Zelenskyy reports “significant disruptions” for several days along the entire front line and in occupied territory, and says the military concluded they are “systematic speed restrictions,” not random errors. SpaceX says no changes were made. The requested SpaceX briefing to the Senate inquiry does not take place.1910

  8. November 12, 2026Allies

    Denmark raises it with Washington

    Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warns that Ukraine and Europe depend on U.S. satellite systems for their defense and says she will raise the restrictions with Washington.11

  9. November 13, 2026Congress

    Senators demand the records be preserved

    Sens. Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Coons ask Musk and SpaceX to preserve contracts, network logs, configuration changes and communications from September 1 onward, including who authorized each restriction, and to answer which restrictions remain in effect, by November 30.12

  10. November 15, 2026Ukraine

    “We don’t think so”

    Zelenskyy says SpaceX attributed the disruptions to “some kind of technical issue” and rejects that explanation. He says strikes on energy and rail infrastructure in eight regions are getting through because the cap is still in place.1314

  11. November 16–18, 2026U.S. government

    Denials, and no investigation

    Ukraine’s Sienik: “Seven days without answers is seven days too many.” The Pentagon denies any policy change, President Trump says he knows nothing about the restrictions, and the Pentagon’s watchdog has declined to formally investigate the October episode.13

Tracker sources (15)
  1. 1.AeroTime, chronology of the October and November 2026 Starshield restrictions
  2. 2.Al Jazeera, “Why Starshield limits are hurting Ukraine against jet-powered drones,” November 16, 2026
  3. 3.Reuters, via the Honolulu Star-Advertiser, “U.S. officials: White House ordered Starshield limits for Ukraine,” October 16, 2026
  4. 4.Sen. Richard Blumenthal, letter to Secretary Hegseth, October 22, 2026
  5. 5.Sen. Richard Blumenthal, letter to SpaceX, October 22, 2026
  6. 6.CEPA, “Europe: Get Satellites or Get Throttled”
  7. 7.DiploFoundation, report on Denys Sienik’s November 5, 2026 briefing
  8. 8.Advanced Television, “SpaceX at risk from Democratic fight back,” November 10, 2026
  9. 9.Interfax-Ukraine, “Starshield disruptions hamper Ukraine’s air defense system – General Staff”
  10. 10.UNITED24 Media, “Ukraine says 100% of missions are failing under Starshield restrictions; SpaceX denies any changes”
  11. 11.UNITED24 Media, “Starshield restrictions let Russian Shahed drones fly deeper into Ukraine, Zelenskyy warns”
  12. 12.U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Shaheen and Coons letter to SpaceX, November 13, 2026
  13. 13.FDD, “Ukraine Still Has No Answer on Starshield Restrictions,” November 18, 2026
  14. 14.AAP via The Senior, “Zelenskiy calls on US to end Starshield restrictions,” November 16, 2026
  15. 15.Holland & Knight, “The 2026 Midterms and the National Security Outlook,” November 13, 2026

Each entry says who is making the claim. Accounts from Ukraine, SpaceX, U.S. officials and anonymous sources conflict; the tracker records them side by side and does not treat a disputed account as settled.

Why Ukraine first

Several networks. Some operations still hang on one.

Ukraine has multiple mobile and broadband networks, and some essential operations still depend heavily on satellite service from a single U.S. company.

Ukraine’s experience raises a question every country should be able to answer:

  • Who can restrict essential service?
  • Under what authority?
  • What keeps people connected if that happens?
A responder holds a radio beside a lit shelter entrance under a Ukrainian flag, with a satellite dish and a distant communications tower.
Editorial illustration of emergency communications during wartime in Ukraine.

What we protect first

The services people cannot live without

Emergency calls

People can reach help when they need it most.

Accessible warnings

Alerts reach everyone, including people with disabilities and people who speak other languages.

Hospitals

Facilities can coordinate emergency transfers.

Humanitarian coordination

Aid workers can reach the people they serve.

Family contact

Families can find one another.

What we need to accomplish

Nine things every country deserves

These are proposed goals, offered for discussion. Partners will shape, test, and complete them once the list of single-provider dependencies has been built and validated together.

  1. A shared, partner-validated list

    Every essential service that depends on one provider, the backup that exists today, and the gaps people actually lived through. Built with the people affected, published in aggregate, with sensitive details protected.

  2. Two independent paths for every essential service

    A proposed goal of two independently operated paths for emergency calling, accessible warnings, hospital coordination, humanitarian communications, and family contact, so no single company, network, or government can silence them.

  3. Backups that are tested, not promised

    Real failover exercises twice a year, observed and recorded: how long it took to restore emergency calling and alerts, which services passed, and when every fix was closed. Results are published.

  4. No silent switch

    In every covered agreement: who can authorize a deliberate restriction, on what legal basis, which services, for how long, who is notified, who owns restoration, and when it is reviewed. Urgent restrictions are documented at the time and reviewed afterward.

  5. A protected way to report pressure

    Providers, officials, and funders disclose relevant conflicts and document material requests. Anyone pressured to cut service has a protected channel to report it, and partner countries have a way to appeal.

  6. Countries that can run their own systems

    Training local technicians, emergency managers, procurement staff, and regulators to operate, maintain, and replace their systems themselves, with vendor exit rights so no partner is locked in.

  7. Service that reaches everyone

    Rural areas, displaced households, people with disabilities, people who speak other languages, and families who cannot afford equipment or power. A backup that only some people can use is not a backup.

  8. Duties that come with dominance

    Any provider that carries a large share of a country’s essential communications takes on critical-infrastructure duties: no unilateral cutoff of essential service, a documented decision and a named authority for any restriction, prompt notice, independent review, and a tested alternative. The same rule applies to every provider, foreign or American, and to every government that directs one.

  9. A record, and accountability

    When service is deliberately restricted and an attack follows, the evidence is preserved, the decision chain is investigated, and lawful accountability follows wherever the evidence leads, including to our own government.

Why

Why no country’s communication should ever be limited or controlled

Communication is how a nation protects its people

A government that cannot warn, evacuate, treat, or reach its own people cannot carry out its first duty. Take away its communications and you take away its ability to govern itself in the moment it matters most.

Whoever holds the switch holds the nation

Dependence becomes leverage. If a company, a funder, or a foreign government can turn service off, it can bargain with a country’s survival and demand political favor in return. Sovereignty that can be switched off is not sovereignty.

Civilians pay first

A shutdown does not sort soldiers from families. The parent waiting for a warning, the patient waiting for a transfer, and the aid worker trying to reach a shelter all lose the line at the same time.

Concentration is fragility, even without bad intent

One provider can fail through a software error, a cyberattack, or a power loss. In July 2025, a global outage that SpaceX attributed to an internal software problem cut service across Ukraine’s front, according to a Ukrainian commander cited by Reuters. A country should never be one mistake away from silence.

People must govern the systems they depend on

The communities affected should have a voice in how their systems are run and the power to keep them running. Decisions about a nation’s lifeline should not be made in a boardroom or a capital half a world away.

One standard, starting with us

Americans would never accept a foreign company deciding whether 911 works during a hurricane. What we would refuse for ourselves, we should refuse for every other nation, and we hold the United States to that standard first.

If we ignore this

Silence becomes a weapon

Calls for help go unanswered.

Warnings never arrive. People shelter in the wrong place or not at all.

Hospitals and aid go blind.

Transfers cannot be coordinated. Aid cannot find the people who need it.

Families lose each other.

In displacement and evacuation, a lost connection can mean a lost child, parent, or neighbor.

Sovereignty becomes negotiable.

Every country that depends on one provider becomes a country that can be pressured.

No one answers for it.

Without records, notice, or review, there is no way to know who decided, why, or what it cost.

It happens again, everywhere.

What is tolerated in one war becomes the precedent for the next, and the next country could be any country, including our own.

It is already happening

Gaza, 2023–24

Humanitarian reporting described recurring outages amid damage, electricity loss, and fuel depletion, and efforts to obtain approval for emergency communications equipment. [9, 10]

Sudan, 2024

Reuters reported outages affecting all three major internet operators during the war. [11]

Myanmar, 2021

The UN Special Rapporteur documented a nationwide temporary mobile internet shutdown after the coup. [12]

KA-SAT, 2022

The EU attributed a cyber operation against a satellite network to Russia, with spillover beyond Ukraine. [13]

Causes differ from case to case: physical damage, power and fuel loss, government directives, and cyberattacks. The result for the people on the ground is the same. They cannot reach help, and help cannot reach them.

The question before every nation

What should we do when communication is controlled and shut off, while our own species is screaming for help, and we cannot hear them?

Somewhere a voice is calling for help into a line that has gone dead. It is a human being, one of us. Their life is worth exactly what ours is worth. Silence on the line does not mean no one is calling.

Where we propose to start

  1. 01

    Restore first.

    Every covered agreement names who restores service and how fast. Restoration of emergency calling cannot wait for a negotiation.

  2. 02

    Keep a second path ready.

    If one line is cut, another independent line is already built, tested, and in the hands of the people it serves.

  3. 03

    No silent switch.

    Any deliberate restriction is documented, the affected country is notified, and the decision is reviewed.

  4. 04

    Preserve the record.

    Evidence is protected from the first hour so the truth can be established later.

  5. 05

    Find out who decided, and why.

    Investigate the full chain: providers, officials, funders, and governments, including our own.

  6. 06

    Pursue justice where the evidence leads.

    If the evidence supports a possible war crime, pursue lawful accountability and ask Congress to remove barriers to justified cooperation.

We do not have every answer. You may.

If you have lived through a shutdown, worked to restore one, or answered calls when the lines went down, tell us what should happen next. Keep sensitive locations, network details, and identifying information out of what you send.

Answer the question

Start by listening

Start by listening and making a list

We invite Ukraine and other countries that depend on a single provider for any essential service to help lead an open discussion. The first step is to hear from affected residents, emergency responders, humanitarian workers, and local operators. Together, we can list the essential services, where each depends on one provider, what backup exists, and what happened when people needed it.

We can complete the proposal only after affected partners have helped build and validate that list.

Share what you have seen

Please share general observations through the campaign contact page.

Stay safe

Keep sensitive locations, network details, and identifying information out of submissions.

Campaign contact page

The path

From a shared list to tested backups

  1. Listen

    Hear from affected residents, emergency responders, humanitarian workers, and local operators.

  2. Make the list together

    Which essential services depend on one provider, what backup exists, and what happened when people needed it.

  3. Validate with partners

    The proposal is completed only after affected partners have helped build and validate that list.

  4. Design and test backups

    With willing participants, beginning with emergency calls, accessible warnings, hospitals, and humanitarian coordination.

  5. Safeguard U.S.-funded contracts

    Continuity plans, documented decisions, and timely restoration for essential services funded by the United States.

  6. Investigate and hold to account

    Credible reports of harmful interruptions are investigated, including who authorized them and whether money or politics influenced the decision.

After partners validate the inventory, we will work with willing participants to design and test independent backup communications, beginning with emergency calls, accessible warnings, hospitals, and humanitarian coordination.

For essential services funded by the United States, we will pursue contracts that require continuity plans, documented decisions, and timely restoration.

Partners stay in control

  • Participating countries help set the terms.
  • They retain control over decisions affecting their people.
  • Local responders, residents, and telecommunications workers define what reliable service means in practice.

Accountability

Who authorized it, and why?

Credible reports of harmful interruptions merit investigation, including who authorized them and whether financial or political pressure influenced the decision. If evidence supports a possible war crime, we will pursue lawful accountability and seek changes to U.S. law where needed for cooperation.

How we measure progress

Share of essential services

that pass independent failover tests

Time to restore

emergency calling and accessible alerts

Whether people get through

the people who rely on the service, not a dashboard

We will measure progress by the share of essential services that pass independent failover tests, the time it takes to restore them, and whether the people who rely on them can actually get through.