The Gate to a Military Base Is Not a Toll Booth

There are responsibilities government may contract out.

A private company can manufacture a scanner. It can develop software, maintain servers, install security equipment, repair gates, operate help desks, and provide administrative support.

But there is a line that should not be crossed.

The authority to determine whether a person is fit to enter a United States military installation belongs to the United States Government.

That decision should be governed by federal standards, authoritative government information, government accountability, and authorized government personnel.

The gate to an American military installation should never become a private toll booth.

What began as a closer look at one commercial access program has uncovered a much larger policy question concerning the relationship between federal contracting, private credentialing, contractor-paid access fees, government security databases, and the increasing privatization of functions closely connected to sovereign authority.

It deserves a national audit.

The Omnivee Case

Omnivee is an identity-management and access-control program operated by Fortior Solutions LLC. The company currently holds GSA Multiple Award Schedule contract 47QTCA26D004L. Fortior’s previous GSA Schedule vehicle, GS-35F-0436U, shows approximately $19.6 million in combined federal obligations across child awards in USAspending data. Those figures represent federal orders under the contract vehicle; they should not be confused with the value of Fortior’s current GSA Schedule itself.

There is nothing inherently improper about Fortior receiving federal contracts.

The concern arises from the structure of the program.

Omnivee currently charges participating vendors approximately $199 per company and $179 per employee for one year of access to one facility. A multi-facility option costs $249 per company and $254 per employee, with an additional credential-management charge. Fortior describes participation as voluntary.

But Fortior’s 2026 program description for government customers goes considerably further.

It states that government customers can order Omnivee through Fortior’s GSA contract while vendor companies and their employees separately pay enrollment, registration, and renewal fees to Fortior. The document expressly states that these payments are remitted to and remain the property of the supplier.

That creates a legitimate public-policy question.

The federal government may be purchasing one side of an access-control program while businesses that must interact with the government purchase another side of the same system.

That does not establish double billing.

But it absolutely justifies asking whether costs are clearly separated, whether any services overlap, and whether the government should permit this structure in the first place.

The Government Still Makes the Final Decision — and That Matters

There is an important distinction that must be stated fairly.

Fortior does not claim that an Omnivee credential overrides the military installation.

Its current agreement expressly states that the participating facility always has the final say regarding who is admitted. Government customers also retain authority to approve participating companies and grant or deny waivers.

That is appropriate.

But final authority is only part of the question.

Fortior’s agreement says employees can undergo commercial background screenings and government database checks, including information derived from NCIC/III and other law-enforcement sources. Additional screenings can occur periodically, continuously, at government request, and—according to the company user agreement—at Fortior’s discretion.

The 2026 government program description also provides Fortior a role in enrollment, vetting, credential production, access authentication and continuing screening. It further states that Fortior maintains ownership and control over vendor-company and vendor-employee program data and that government customers generally do not have physical or logical access to Fortior’s program information system.

That deserves much closer examination.

America should be extremely cautious whenever a commercial company becomes the repository, processor and intermediary for sensitive identity information used to determine eligibility for recurring access to military property.

The government may properly contract for technology.

It should be much more reluctant to privatize the security judgment surrounding the technology.

We Have Seen This Problem Before

This is not an entirely theoretical concern.

In 2013, the Department of Defense Inspector General examined the Navy Commercial Access Control System involving RAPIDGate.

The Inspector General concluded that the system did not effectively mitigate contractor access-control risks. The audit found that 52 convicted felons received routine unauthorized installation access. It also found deficient cost accounting, inappropriate contracting practices and more than $1.1 million in disallowable costs. The Inspector General recommended replacing RapidGate with a system using required authoritative databases and improving government access to those resources.

That finding concerns a historical implementation.

It would be incorrect to automatically assume that today's Omnivee program has the same technical or procedural deficiencies. Programs, policies and technology have changed.

But history matters when making policy.

The federal government has already experienced the risks created when commercial access-control arrangements become intertwined with military installation security.

We should learn from that history rather than repeat it under a new product name or business model.

“Voluntary” Must Mean Voluntary in Reality

There is another lesson from the historical record.

At Camp Lejeune and Marine Corps Air Station New River, contractors who declined RAPIDGate were initially permitted a temporary pass but subsequently had to return for a new pass every four days. Marine Corps guidance warned those contractors to expect frequent visits and potentially long wait times.

Technically, the commercial program was voluntary.

But consider the position of a plumbing contractor, courier, medical carrier, construction company or supplier entering an installation every day.

If one option is purchasing the commercial credential and the other is repeatedly standing in a government office obtaining four-day passes, we have to ask whether that choice is meaningfully voluntary.

That leads to an important policy principle:

A paid private credentialing program should not be considered voluntary merely because an alternative technically exists. The alternative must also be practical, timely and reasonably accessible.

The same issue exists today.

Omnivee's own FAQ tells companies that if they choose not to register, they may be required to get out of their vehicle and wait in line at Pass ID each day they access a facility.

That makes the quality of the government alternative central to the entire debate.

The Federal Government Is Sometimes Making Contractors Pay These Costs

Our review has also uncovered federal procurement language that deserves scrutiny.

A current 2026 Defense Logistics Agency solicitation tells contractors that military bases may require systems such as RapidGate, DBIDS or other security programs. It makes the contractor responsible for enrollment costs and estimates approximately $250 per company and $200 per employee for annual multi-location enrollment. Similar language appears in an official DLA contracting document from an earlier procurement.

That means the issue is larger than a vendor choosing to sell a service.

The federal procurement system itself can effectively tell an awarded contractor:

You are responsible for paying whatever access-related charges are necessary to perform this federal contract.

That deserves review.

It is also confusing because DBIDS is a government-owned system, and Navy guidance states that there is no cost to obtain a DBIDS credential in the examples we reviewed.

Perhaps the DLA language is generic boilerplate.

Perhaps certain installations impose related costs.

Perhaps different systems are being grouped together imprecisely.

We should not speculate.

We should audit it.

DBIDS Shows That Another Model Already Works

The Defense Biometric Identification System provides an important comparison.

DBIDS is a Department of Defense system developed by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Navy guidance explains that contractors who require access can present government sponsorship, identification and the required security form at the Visitor Control Center. The VCC conducts the background-check and enrollment process and issues the credential.

Naval Base Guam explicitly states:

There is no cost for a DBIDS card.

That matters.

The choice is therefore not between private credentialing and no security.

The government has already demonstrated that it can maintain a government-owned system, conduct government-controlled screening, issue credentials and continuously evaluate access without turning contractor access into a recurring private subscription.

That is the model we should expand and modernize.

Not Every Private Enrollment Fee Is the Same

Our audit also uncovered an important distinction that prevents this argument from becoming overly broad.

Consider the Transportation Worker Identification Credential.

IDEMIA performs enrollment services for TSA and receives substantial federal contract funding. One Universal Enrollment Services delivery order currently shows approximately $59 million obligated. TWIC applicants also pay a $124 credential fee.

At first glance, that sounds almost identical.

It is not.

TWIC is a federally regulated credential. TSA performs the Security Threat Assessment and determines whether the applicant is eligible. The Coast Guard regulates its use for maritime security.

The private contractor performs enrollment functions.

The government performs the sovereign security adjudication.

The same distinction is visible in TSA PreCheck. TSA currently authorizes IDEMIA, Telos and CLEAR as enrollment providers. Applicants can choose among providers, and TSA retains control of the federal program and eligibility determination.

Telos, for example, has a 10-year TSA PreCheck enrollment agreement. Telos has said that agreement could generate more than $1.5 billion in revenue over time, but its own disclosure explains that the company collects application information, biometrics and applicant fees and provides the information to TSA for adjudication. That projected revenue should therefore not be casually described as $1.5 billion in taxpayer-funded federal obligations.

That distinction is critical.

The policy should not simply say:

“A federal contractor may never collect a fee.”

That would be far too broad.

The rule should concern mandatory governmental security requirements, sovereign decision-making, cost shifting and commercial barriers to federal property.

The Real Policy Test

The questions should be straightforward.

Does the company receive federal compensation for the same or closely related security function?

Does it separately charge the people or businesses subject to that security system?

Who authorized the fee?

Who determines its amount?

Who establishes the vetting standards?

Who can modify those standards?

Who conducts the screening?

Who controls the resulting sensitive information?

Who adjudicates eligibility?

Can someone decline the commercial service and still receive timely government access?

And are federal taxpayers and private contractors financing overlapping portions of the same function?

Those questions give us a much better standard than simply asking whether a company receives government awards.

Existing Federal Acquisition Policy Already Points Toward Caution

Federal acquisition law recognizes that some functions are too closely connected to public authority to be handed to contractors.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation prohibits contractors from performing inherently governmental functions and specifically identifies certain adjudicatory and eligibility determinations as governmental responsibilities. It also requires enhanced government oversight where contractor work closely supports governmental decision-making.

Current law does not expressly say that every activity involved in military-base visitor processing is inherently governmental. Routine building security itself may be contracted.

But that does not end the policy discussion.

There is a significant difference between a contractor guarding a building and a contractor exercising meaningful discretion over whether a citizen satisfies criteria for continuing access to a military installation.

Our policy should make that distinction explicit.

A Federal Contract Should Not Become Permission to Tax Other Contractors

The procurement principle should be simple.

When the United States awards a company a contract to provide an access-control system, the contractor should bid the reasonably anticipated cost of performing that contract.

If background screening is required, price it.

If credential production is required, price it.

If software maintenance is required, price it.

If continuous monitoring is required, price it.

The contracting officer can then determine whether the proposal represents good value for the taxpayer.

What we should not normalize is a system in which a federal contractor wins the government’s business and then gains an additional commercial revenue stream by charging the businesses that must pass through that federally required system.

There may be circumstances where Congress or federal regulation expressly authorizes an applicant fee.

When that happens, the authority should be transparent, the fee methodology should be controlled, the purpose should be disclosed and final adjudication should remain with government.

Otherwise, the cost belongs in the federal procurement.

Small Businesses Pay the Highest Price

This issue also concerns competition.

A recurring access fee is relatively insignificant to a multibillion-dollar corporation.

It can be very significant to a one-person courier company, local electrician, locksmith, medical carrier, construction subcontractor, janitorial supplier or small trucking business.

Multiply the cost by employees.

Multiply it again by facilities.

Add renewals.

Add credential fees.

Add processing time.

Then add the possibility that a driver cannot perform a federal delivery because a private credential has not finished processing.

The United States says it wants small businesses competing for federal opportunities.

Then federal access policy should not create privately monetized barriers that disproportionately burden the smallest competitors.

The Better System

America should establish one clear national principle:

Military installation access adjudication is a governmental responsibility.

Private companies may build technology supporting that mission.

They may maintain systems.

They may manufacture credential readers.

They may provide administrative services under tightly controlled government contracts.

But authorized government personnel should establish the access standards, control the authoritative vetting criteria, adjudicate eligibility, issue or authorize the government credential, control appeals and waivers, and retain ultimate accountability.

The government should also modernize the process.

Contractors should be able to securely pre-enroll before arriving.

Government databases should be checked electronically.

A qualified applicant should be processed rapidly.

Government credentials should be interoperable across installations wherever security requirements permit.

Continuous government vetting should replace repetitive paperwork.

Gate verification should take seconds.

Government-controlled does not have to mean inefficient.

It should be faster because we eliminate unnecessary commercial layers.

We Are Beginning a National Access-Fee Audit

Before writing the final policy, we should identify the full scope of the problem.

We are therefore examining military, homeland-security and other federal access programs to determine where private contractors receive government awards while also charging contractors, workers or applicants.

The audit will distinguish lawful regulated enrollment arrangements from privately monetized federal access systems.

It will examine federal award values, applicant and vendor fees, fee authority, vetting standards, adjudication authority, government databases, data ownership, practical alternatives, procurement requirements and possible overlap between taxpayer-funded and privately funded services.

That distinction matters.

The purpose is not to accuse companies of wrongdoing simply because they operate under federal contracts.

The purpose is to determine whether government has transferred too much authority, too much data, too much responsibility or too much cost onto private intermediaries.

And where it has, we should correct it.

Some Things Should Not Be for Sale

Government cannot and should not perform everything itself.

The private sector builds extraordinary technology.

Federal contractors perform indispensable work every day.

But privatization must have limits.

Military authority is one of them.

The right to determine who enters a United States military installation is inseparable from the government's responsibility to protect that installation.

A company may build the scanner.

A company may service the server.

A company may design the software.

But the security criteria should belong to the government.

The sensitive decision should belong to the government.

The credential should represent government authority.

The appeal should go to the government.

And a legitimate American business should not have to purchase a private subscription simply to efficiently conduct authorized business with its own federal government.